KHALIL NOURI: AFGHANISTAN: REVISION TO MAJOR JIM GANT’S DOCTRINE: “ONE TRIBE AT A TIME”
March 13, 2010 posted by Khalil Nouri · 28 Comments
Major Jim Gant in Afghanistan
By Khalil Nouri STAFF WRITER
VETERANS TODAY
Major Jim Gant, an Army silver star Green Beret hero, considered the best field grade officer for the “AfPak Hands” program. He is also the author of “One Tribe at a Time” and an outspoken advocate of Afghan tribal engagement strategy (TES), who lived and breathed the notion for years, and outstandingly, he has the ears and attention of the brass in his chain of command.
Gant’s proposal centers on the idea that, “it’s insignificant as how many troops are deployed; it’s how they can be best utilized.” He is promoting; the field American “tribal engagement teams” (TET) to live with — and fight alongside — Pashtun tribesmen, who dominate Southern and Eastern Afghanistan with little faith in, or loyalty to, the central government. His advocacy is to use the centuries-old tribal code of honor, justice and revenge, called “Pashtunwali” system (the only system of governance) to defeat the Taliban.
But the question remains: would the tribal strategy that perceived magically to charm Afghanistan’s future be achievable?
Major Gant’s outstanding and enthusiastic presentation not only reflects the correct itinerary but also in close vicinity of integrating the real aspects of centuries old Afghan tribal structure into a practical model that could eventually change the entire dynamics of the war in Afghanistan.
Moreover, if this is a chance for succeeding and bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan, it will mean; learning from our mistakes and more importantly, recognizing the obstacle in terms of culture, norms, geopolitics, and religion, thus, not to deny them and not to ignore them.
Mission Hurdles
Taming “Yaghistan” (the land of the unruly) — as the Afghans traditionally labeled Afghanistan — is the most burdensome and complex mission since WWII; first and foremost, nothing fundamentally will change in the region until the issue with the Durand line is resolved. The creation of the border line since inception, its failure then — to regularize the position, and its continued failure, should be a justifiable reason for a thorough UN evaluation and revision.
As a clear reminder that, ever since the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been adversaries, with the tribal areas and the Northwest frontier territories being at the center of the dispute.
As Emir Abdul Rahman, ruler of Afghanistan when the Durand mission did its work in (1893) writes to the Viceroy of India, warning him of the dangers of splitting the peoples of the tribal areas. “If you should cut them out of my dominions,” he said, “they will neither be of any use to you nor to me: you will always be engaged in fighting and troubles with them, and they will always go on plundering.”
Within seven years, the Emir was to be proven right, with the British having to put down major uprisings, dealing with — North West Frontier Agencies (NWFA) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) — Chitral, Bajaur, Malakand, Waziri and Afridi wars, and now, history is repeating itself except with vast span of the Pashtun belt gearing for a state of chaos.
The Irony is that, with the current coalition policy of expanding the Afghan Army, the Emir was arguing back in 1893 that the “brave warriors” of the tribal regions would “make a very strong force” and that only a ruler of Afghanistan could “make them peaceful subjects”. Divorced from Afghanistan, they are the problem— within Afghanistan, they could be part of the solution. Hence, broadening Major Gant’s policy to the Pakistan’s neglected areas of FATA and NWFP without resolving the Durand line will be hopeless.
Aside from the above obscurity, many Afghans and Afghan-Americans believe that no matter how well-trained or Afghan-culture sensitive U.S. Special Forces are, they will never know enough about a specific local area and its indigenous norms to carry out their daily counterinsurgency campaign effectively; because the people will never trust them enough to share everything. Perhaps one bonanza by TET was effectively struck with the Mangal tribal elder Malik Noor Afzhal — as Major Gant calls him “Sitting Bull” — and apparently no other tribal elders were put to attest for the workability of such doctrine.
In fact, this is also Major Gant’s main challenge as he states in his paper; “The situation at each tribe will be complex and will vary with each tribe.”
True, tribal structures are not uniform across Afghanistan, they are very complex, and there is no standardized or “one size fits all” setting. Unlike the Paktia tribes— the traditional political authorities are in fact village and or tribal elders and or local Mullahs or Maulavis; who do not share power equally and do not exist in a “traditional” sense of the word, and very much will not invigorate the social and moral fabric of the society— However, the Durrani and Ghilzai tribes in Southern Afghanistan have no tradition of raising volunteer forces (Arbaki in Pashto language) to maintain local Security. This is why Taliban managed to emerge and successfully (but deceitfully) sell themselves as neighborhood Gladiator figures, protecting regular folks from marauding warlords.
But the tribal leaders among the tribes still command considerable respect and exert influence in their communities. The fact is that, tribal leaders with deep roots in local communities can make a difference, and therefore, the tribal mindset differs tribe to tribe throughout Afghanistan.
The costs
In fact, as a roadmap to success for Afghanistan, TES will require a complete paradigm shift in Pentagon’s operational culture— from conventional risk-averse micromanagement to unconventional decision making, Command and Control and Rules of Engagement. This is a significant cost in addition to financially prospering the tribes.
The risks
For this — One Tribe at a Time — model to bear fruit; the deploying courageous volunteers TET must be “sincere and devoted volunteers” for popular resistances against oppressive forces. Whenever such agile and courageously committed fighters are introduced to live in local tribal communities and even when they are personally driven to help the society fight against local oppressors. They still could be viewed in the eyes of indigenous that they are actually working for a larger, but hidden, oppressive Empire,— United States — as was the case with the “best and brightest” in Vietnam, then the results can be disastrous— because the real motive is viewed as fabrication, a sham, and at heart, a lie.
The gravest concern is, the U.S. may eventually again abandon Afghanistan — as foreign powers come and go — and the tribes to whom coalition forces have promised long-term support will be left to be massacred by a vengefulTalibn.
If Obama’s recent call to start bringing the troops home in 18 months, and also with fragile NATO alliance that the Dutch to depart first and then the Canadians, will likely to create an alliance of worrisome tribal chieftains whether to continue trusting the U.S. and NATO further. This could tip the balance into a state of confusion and may cause reluctance to prop up tranquility in Afghanistan.
Despite the fact that the code of (Pashtunwali) amongst some tribes is considered primary than the religion of Islam, but still If TET does not have the same devotion towards Islam as the inhabitants do, then they are considered outsiders. The mosque remains the clandestine decision place for a quick close-door Jirgah (Grand Assembly) where one cannot even infiltrate as what was discussed amongst the tribal members. At the end of the day, the final decision will network itself in agility to other mosques where public awareness could multiply exponentially.
Gant’s notion requires a profound understanding of Afghan tribal politics; for one to walk a fine-line between tribal community feuds he must be capable of extinguishing a potential rebellion that could easily be ignited by a meaningless or sensitive tribal issue. For example; using one tribe against another or taking sides with one or interference into tribal affairs could result in an inflammable consequence.
As Lord Roberts British viceroy to Kandahar recognized this when, at the end of the second Afghan war in 1880 he said, “the less they –Afghans—are able to see us, the less likely are to hate us…..we will have much greater chance of getting the Afghans on our side if we abstain from any interference in their internal affairs whatsoever.”
However, it is needles to say that the Afghan society is a barely penetrable jungle— with its more than fifty ethnic groups, 400 plus tribes and vast sub tribes and clans, religious groups, mystical brotherhoods, mafia networks, village communities and nomads’ camps, with the clienteles of political actors, the militias of the warlords, bands of robbers and urban neighborhoods, plus marriage alliances, professional guilds and internationally networked trade and bazaar structures. In such a jungle, even the gutsiest gladiator with all his might is quickly lost.
Alternate Solution
Day by day a growing chorus of voices is heard saying that the tribes are the solution in Afghanistan. This very powerful grassroots movement is blossoming; and it can give the Afghan people new hope, self-esteem and a sense of belonging. But, to make sure that there is success to this notion, an effective bottom-up approach tool is required to match the existing top-down approach so that jointly both approaches can rescue the nation.
One must bear in mind that, the importance of understanding the strength and degree of tribe and clan-based loyalties and what happens when foreign occupiers interfere in the traditional order of balance and stability that took thousands of years to set in place; foreign displacement of Pashtun authority will always result in resentment exponentially within layers of tribal hierarchy.
After decades of wars, famine and all around instability; dire sociological stresses, severe ethnic tensions, imbalance of societal structure, and downward native vibrancy (depression) has resulted; but, all could be overturned if a robust and well intended bottom-up approach can be introduced.
But, to overcome chronic national symptoms and restore the nation’s cultural, social, political and economic health; a practical blueprint should be defined as a framework in terms of “accessible resources.” The very necessary and indispensable resources that Afghanistan desperately needs today are Expatriate Afghans as well as the underutilized Afghans inside Afghanistan.
The current U.S. military operation in Afghanistan is just beginning to realize the importance of the tribes. That is why; the Community Defense Initiative (CDI) is now being enthusiastically backed by General Stanley McChrystal. This is a huge transition for the U.S. and NATO operations that can be valued more deeply by engaging a framework for an Afghan-American to tribal Afghan cause.
Unlike Iraq, the degree of tribal complexity in Afghanistan is much higher. We believe, enlisting tribes against militants not only carries risks in terms of promoting warlord strategy, but also could undermine the hard work which was done previously disarming proscribed militias. Therefore, in contrary to Major Jim Gant’s doctrine, our approach is – a clear Afghan solution to an Afghan cause – considered a nonmilitary one.
According to the Census Bureau, there are between 200,000 plus Expatriate Afghan-Americans. Their ethnic backgrounds reflect ethnicities of all Afghan origins, and most have preserved their close ties with their tribes and clans inside Afghanistan. Culturally, their family bond and social intimacy is as strong as ever. Furthermore, the strength and degree of tribe and clan-based loyalties is the solid foundation that has knitted the tribal constituents for centuries.
Placing the above circumstances into perspective; the question arises as to how a thriving bottom-up approach can be implemented?
The real method
Initially the formula can be an empowerment of face to face interaction between; an Afghan in the U.S. (a tribal representative) and an Afghan in Afghanistan (a tribal leader), whose tribal roots are connected and are in acquaintanceship to each other. In regards to a tribal representative, he is not only loyal to his tribe but also to his adopted counrty the United States. Therefore, a genuine connection with “strings-attached” can be achieved. On the contrary, in the perception of top-down approach, trustworthiness and tribal interlink is unachievable, and evidently has resulted in failure and disappointment.
Major Jim Gant meeting with tribal elders
Furthermore, the tribal leader and tribal representative will be implementing the said mutual interaction exclusively in a business tribal council framework we call “business-Jirgah to business-Jirgah” –- or “Biz Jirgah to Biz Jirgah”— which should be applicable within local responsibilities and local structure, with cost effectiveness in mind, and free of foreign bureaucracies.
In addition, “Biz Jirgah to Biz Jirgah” involves establishing business relationships, and actual business initiatives on a people to people (rather than a nation to nation) basis, where each Afghan tribe is invited and encouraged to establish a business that can work closely with its Afghan-American business counterpoint and eventually grow from micro to macro.
These standardized and fixed priced businesses — specialized assets — can reflect basic human necessities such as potable water, cold storages, fish farms, chicken farms, and so forth; while they can be built in areas that are in compliance with individual tribal approval.
In addition, by using this concept which is in phase with thousands of years of customary Afghan culture, the stigma of foreign intervention is diminished and real dialogue and trust can be developed. As the result, the seeds of trust between Afghan and American business interests are firmly planted, and needed infrastructure projects can be completed within acceptable time-frames and maintained for generations.
This indigenous interaction can not only strike a successful agreement between the tribal players, but it can also be cost effective in terms of non obligation of force protection, since no American Military Civil Affairs or International Development personnel are engaged.
Major Gant’s “One Tribe at a Time” initiative—minus to live with and fight alongside the tribes—can easily be persevered and switched for a genuine and convincing dialogue within the Afghan tribal communities in the United States, Europe and Elsewhere in the world. It is a doable prospect but has to be an Afghan instigation only.
Once the communities inside Afghanistan start ascending towards prosperity, self fortification against intruders and area insurgency will be weakened, and at the end of day, flourishing and self esteemed communities likely to join together and thrive economically with domino effects.
In the initial stages, this program requires full U.S. financial support, so that the average person’s day-to-day necessities come from income he generates; and he can turn away from insurgency recruitment for hire to feed his family.
And finally, no central agency in Kabul can ever know the priority needs of people in every Afghan village, and unity cannot be delivered from the top. But when local leaders, engaged — for an Afghan solution — in the nitty-gritty of local policymaking, practice fairness and inclusion, the people will follow. A weak state cannot be made strong overnight. But it can set up the systems that catalyze strong local communities by adopting village by village “Biz Jirgah to Biz Jirgah” initiatives.
In hindsight, Major Jim Gant does not need to take the risk fighting alongside the tribes to protect them against the militants. With this flourishing economical opportunity, they will do anything to protect themselves and their communities against any obstacle.
Khalil Nouri is the cofounder of New World Strategies Coalition Inc., a native think tank for nonmilitary solution studies for Afghanistan. www.nwscinc.org
The redrawing and partition of the Middle East from the Eastern Mediterranean shores of Lebanon and Syria to Anatolia (Asia Minor), Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and the Iranian Plateau responds to broad economic, strategic and military objectives, which are part of a longstanding Anglo-American and Israeli agenda in the region.
The Middle East has been conditioned by outside forces into a powder keg that is ready to explode with the right trigger, possibly the launching of Anglo-American and/or Israeli air raids against Iran and Syria. A wider war in the Middle East could result in redrawn borders that are strategically advantageous to Anglo-American interests and Israel.
NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan has been successfully divided, all but in name. Animosity has been inseminated in the Levant, where a Palestinian civil war is being nurtured and divisions in Lebanon agitated. The Eastern Mediterranean has been successfully militarized by NATO. Syria and Iran continue to be demonized by the Western media, with a view to justifying a military agenda. In turn, the Western media has fed, on a daily basis, incorrect and biased notions that the populations of Iraq cannot co-exist and that the conflict is not a war of occupation but a “civil war” characterised by domestic strife between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds.
Attempts at intentionally creating animosity between the different ethno-cultural and religious groups of the Middle East have been systematic. In fact, they are part of a carefully designed covert intelligence agenda.
Even more ominous, many Middle Eastern governments, such as that of Saudi Arabia, are assisting Washington in fomenting divisions between Middle Eastern populations. The ultimate objective is to weaken the resistance movement against foreign occupation through a “divide and conquer strategy” which serves Anglo-American and Israeli interests in the broader region.
Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya is in an independent writer based in Ottawa specializing in Middle Eastern and Central Asian affairs. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).
The Brits in Afghanistan is a beast all of its own. I know most are probably going to think I am crazy, but again, the Afghans do not always see things the way we do. To the Afghans the British are a vanquished enemy, so from the get go the British are behind the power curve. What ??…yes, the Aghans see the British as a vanquished enemy (which they are) and even though it is 2009 and not the 1800-1900s the Afghans don’t forget. If you talk to most Afghans they speak as though Alexander the Great just dropped by yesterday.
Why all the trouble in Helmand, where the British were located before the Marines moved in…Governor Akhundzada was removed.
Governor Akhundzada was by no means an angel, but he was/is pro-US and anti-Taliban/Al-Qaeda and he was from the most powerful tribe in Helmand Province. As a result Governor Akhundzada held the respect of the people of Helmand Province and was able to keep the “bad guys” (Taliban, Al-Qaeda and whomever else) in check. But in 2005 the British insisted Governor Ahkundzada be removed and he was replaced by an outsider. His replacement Daoud was dead in the water from day one and was eventually replaced. They are now on their third or fourth governor since Akhundzada and no one other than a local powerful Helmand province tribal elder is going to be able to bring peace back to Helmand, not the Brits, not the US military, no one. But we westerners just don’t get it.
I am by no means saying the attack is warranted or right, just trying to shed some insite as to why the British did and the US military is having such a hard time in southern Afghanistan.
As an Afghan born American, I agree with Khalil Nouri that Afghanistan would not have an stable government without the help and approval of tribal chiefs, and no army in the history of Afghanistan has accomplished that by itself, and even Alexander the Great had to marry Roxanne, in order to create an alliance with the tribes in Afghanistan. The last king of Afghanistan who ruled Afghanistan for 40 years had the best relationship with the tribes and those days is called the Golden years of Afghanistan, but unfortunately the Russian war changed everything for the worst.Before the partition of India all the Pashtoon tribes were together and living next to eacother and there were no boundary among them, but the creation of the Durant Line by the British created a separations between the families and tribes, and after the partition of India half beacme a part of the new country of Pakistan, and that created a tension between Pakistan and Afghanista from the early days. The Afghan government and the coalition forces have to start a dilogue with the head of the tribes and bring them to their side, and if it takes one tribe at atime, it’s still more promissing than what is happening right now, after nine years of occupations by the US, and coalition forces, they still have no stable government. Pashtunwalli is the oldest code of honor among the Pashtoon tribes, and all tribes in Afghanistan and Pakistan will honor that’ if they agree on something that is approved by their elders, so the unifiaction of the tribes, is an important key to success in Afghanistan. Let’s not forget the more important issue, that is not resolved, is: Does Pakistan want an stable govenment in Afghanistan? The pakistan government especially the ISI, (Pakistan secret service)became a big palyer in Afghanistan’s future, since the Russian war of 1979. The ISI, created the Taliban with the help of CIA, and Saudi’s money, and controlled them, and they still do. Everytime there is a negotiation between the head of a tribe and the government of Afghanistan, the ISI, will screw it up for them, and the best example is the arrest of the # 2, Taliban leader in Karachi, Pakistan. He had started a dialogue between the taliban and the head of United Nation, and the Afghan government, and he met the delegation members in Dubai, last year, and things were looking promissing till theISI, found out and arrested Mr.BARADAR, in Karachi, last month, and blew up the whole deal. This is what the head of UN, said:”The UN’s former envoy to Afghanistan, Kai Eide, has strongly criticised Pakistan’s recent arrest of high-ranking Taliban leaders”. Without the unification of the tribes, and cooperation of Pakistan, there will be no stable government in Afghanistan.
My perception has been managed such that I think the Americans are desperately grasping at any straws that will put enough Afghan feet into boots on the ground to meet the magic number of COIN per head of population to be protected, and do it before the American people quit on Afghanistan.
Whatever we do that does not resound to the credit of the Karzai regime reduces his government’s legitimacy. The plain fact is that the ANA and ANP cannot or will not defend the villages. If they could there would be no need for Village Defense Forces.
This Biz Jirgah initiative by NWSC is something rewarding and I can see an Afghan solution. I must confess to the fact that this is a great approach and Major should team up with NWSC to come up with a viable plan.
Jon
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Thank you Nouri Sahib;
This is a profound idea for a Biz Jirgah, and a very deep rooted philosophy that can unite the Pashtuns all over Afghanistan.
In the issue of the Durand Line, I think we should resolve the as soon as possible! We, Pashtuns of Afghanistan very much want to be united with our Pashtun people on the Pakistani side. The question is do the Pashtuns on the Pakistani side want to be part of Afghanistan. I think they should make this clear to us. If they want to be Pakistani then we should accept that and accept the border and move on. Our relations with them should be just like with the other countries and we will of course have a much closer cultural and economic tie with them. It’s good to finally know what Pashtun on the Pakistani side want. How long do we want to dream of unification of Pashtuns? They cannot let us wait longer than 10 years. We do understand that Pakistan offered them peace and some prosperity but our offer is much more significant! Unification with their Pashtun brothers and sisters! A chance to lead the Afghans, a chance to become the leader of Afghanistan! We made our choice one hundred year ago, it’s up to Pashtuns on Pakistani side to make their choice!
We have many big problems in Afghanistan and we should focus on that.
Thank you
Hamza
Kandahar, Afghanistan
Dear Hamza;
As Ronald Reagan said “Tear Down This Wall Mr. Gorbachev” We Afghans should state the same for unification of our fellow Afghans in NWFP and FATA.
We will not see any results until the superseded British policy of devide and rule is entirely removed as the Berlin wall was removed.
Thank you for your posting.
Khalil
Salaam alaykum, Khalil jan.
An extremely interesting article that is genuinely thought provoking.
I find positive ideas in both Gant’s and your proposals. But I fear the situation was allowed by Bush, Musharraf and Karzai to degenerate to such a degree that little is workable any more, i.e, we may have already run out of time. Indeed, one of your most salient points is that as the Pashtuns realize that Obama intends to disengage from Afghanistan militarily, they will do nothing that could bring retaliation by the Taliban once the US is gone. I fear that such a dynamic may very well already be playing out.
There are several problems with Gant’s approach (I was offered an opportunity to discuss his proposal with him and could not make the time). First, as you point out, decision making in the villages is now made in the mosque, influenced to a major extent by the mullah. This is because of the disintegration of the traditional tribal structure that has occurred as a result of 40 years of war and the supplanting of the elders’ authority by religious authority that began with the anti-Soviet jihad. That process accelerated under the Taliban’ rule and is accelerating as a new generation of more radicalized Talibs impose their authority through shadow “governments,” helped by the corruption or total absence of local authorities associated with the US-backed Karzai government. Also, let’s not forget that those fighters are also members of tribes. So this idea of distinguishing between the “tribes” and the Taliban is extremely dubious.
Then there are the traditional disputes that undermine the unity that is required if tribes under traditional elders are going to be recruited to fight the Taliban. The latest example is the infighting that erupted among the Shinwaris in Nangahar.
A third point is that the Brits tried the “tribe by tribe” approach and had a checkered record. That approach was the foundation for the creation of the tribal levies in the FATA. Look where that went. The only time the tribes on the border really united was under Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the movement to expel the Brits and the jihad against the Soviets. The FATA has never known tranquility.
Finally, your business-driven approach is extremely compelling but faces serious practical hurdles, beginning with the continuing lack of infrastructure. Then, there is enormous resentment and suspicion against Afghan expats thanks to the enormous corruption and abuses with which some in and out of the government are associated, led by Mahmoud Karzai and his ilk. In Kabul, as you know, they are known as “dog washers.” Secondly, there is little or no understanding of business professionalism or ethics or even the basics like accounting at the local level. These can be taught, for sure, but not in the absence of security. Such efforts inevitably are hijacked by the worst elements associated with the district chiefs and their patrons, the provincial governors, or with other local mafias or extremists. Everybody inevitably wants their share. Perhaps this is actually a key to making such an arrangement work. But it would be extremely tough.
Just some thoughts. I would welcome yours in return. Cheers,
Jonathan
Jonathan;
Ans: Thank you for your kind words and it is an honor my article is of interest to you.
Ans: Absolutely, this is a typical American politics to buy constituent votes for the next upcoming election in order to justify to the average American populace that “we have brought our boys home.” But make no mistake; the window of opportunity could be turned around if a thorough and fundamental adjustment for the mistakes to be addressed. Example, a redefine of Bonn conference should take place instead of the upcoming Karzai ill-fated and wrongly fabricated Jirgah. In this new Bonn type of agreement the cause of Afghanistan’s derailment must be the topic of the agenda and the consequence of Afghanistan disintegration with new emergence of Pashtunistan and redefining Pakistan’s boundary is imminent. A participation of all ethnicities from all tribal spectrum who have no blood stains on their hands should be part of this Bonn type Jirgah. As I said, the upcoming Jirgah being conducted by Karzai is not going to bear any fruits. He is viewed as someone that has no public support and the West is in puppeteer position, which is discrediting NATO and US operations in Afghanistan. So the West should come to their senses by making it obvious that he is not the man to lead, but that could take a lot of effort. The West should shun their idiosyncrasy that Karzai is the best they got. Thee
Please go to my solution 19 in our website http://www.nwscinc.org for how we defined choosing the head of state. This was done way before the election in Afghanistan. You will realize this is how a frivolous election could have been avoided that made Karzai the illegitimate head of Afghanistan. We knew this was going to be the mother of a vote rigging election of all times. The irony is that, it will be the same when Karzai’s 5 year term is going to be over. A revised Bonn conference will definitely buy the trust of the people only if wrong doings to be admitted by saying “we are humans and no one is free of mistakes.”
Ans: Very true, I see it coming when a real Jirgahs are taking place in sacred Moslem mosques. I can fully agree with you regarding the notion of Taliban being in the epicenter of the mosque jirgahs. On the other hand, as you also mentioned, there are Taliban fighters within the tribes and families. The only ones that could distinguish them are the heads of the snakes (tribal elders) and they can give the green light or integrate them within the tribes if prosperous jobs are given to them. Now, our initiative could bring a change for a particular tribe in that concept.
Ans: Yes, there will be a lot of backstabbing and intrigue; this takes a lot of work and a need for an acceptable Pashtun leader who can call for a unity amongst the tribes, but I really have not put my thoughts as how a cure for this can be addressed.
Ans: Very true, and I have answered in my article regarding the Brits made the mistake before partition of India and Pakistan by defining the wrong approach for marking the Durand Line in a wrong territory. But their policy then accepted the notion of divide and rule. If a genuine “Pashtun Awami National” leader like Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan to emerge I believe things will change. Knowing the fact that Pakistan is in state of fragility and I don’t see very much hope on those provinces, agencies and Baluchistan. What strikes me the most even Pakistan being in a state of collapse and to spiral further, there is no national unity amongst the political parties. I see a very genuine leader a former and famous cricket player name Imran Khan to lead the country. This could bring a change. We are doing all we can to bring Prince Ali the grandchild of Emir Abdul Rahaman and Imran Khan together for a Pakistan-Afghanistan national dialogue. Our delegation was in Islamabad and Kabul two weeks ago and there are some good intentions from both men.
Ans: I see your point, thank you for addressing it, and let me explain as why we call it a business:
It is an adopted name for the West in particular –congress as the audience– that we are selling the initiative in the name of “Biz Jirgah”, but in fact it is “face to face” tribal interaction where bread and butter could be placed on their table (in Afghani term: on their floor cloth). This is for the street level population where the bulk of the problem is, and they are the ones never seen the good days since the US and NATO toppled the Taliban. What the notion of the business is to put people to work and bring unity within every tribe. I am in close contact with some Pashtun and Uzbek tribal representatives here in the West Coast and they all accept this initiative for their tribes inside Afghanistan. As you know well, every tribe has its own governance and every tribe has to be nurtured in their particular way, and that could turn them away from guns and killings. If I may explain it more broadly; every expat tribal representative has its own tribe inside Afghanistan, and they have brothers, mothers and close relatives that are in need of financial help. Therefore, they will do anything to help their own people inside Afghanistan. For example; I know families that are sending money and computers, cars and even clothes to Afghanistan. So this is a great opportunity for them to help their tribes and therefore we could not name anything else but “biz Jirgah.”
Hope my answers were in your view and if not we will elaborate more.
Thank you my friend,
Khalil
Khalil Nouri,
“lay yow las tak na khagee”
Thank you very much for this informative idea…there is something to this. I am not exactly sure what yet, but I think our ideas are “synergistic”…you have me thinking, that is for sure.
Once again, thank you for your tone, your insight, and your knowlegde on the subject. I make no apologies for the fact that I care deeply for the Pashtun tribes and I want Afghanistan to one day be a place where the people there may live in peace and prosperity.
I will be there again soon and will keep you informed as to how it is going.
Please let me know if I can be of assistance.
STRENGTH AND HONOR
Jim Gant
Major Gant;
“Da Kho Sama Khabara Da .. La Yow Las Tak Na Khezee” Masha Allah Pashto Di Der Sha Di.
My hats off to you, Sir!
With gratitude, it is a privilege to read your posting, and thank you for your kind words.
As I was writing the article my view was solely focused for unification—or “YAW-WALI” in Pasto— of combine Gant and Nouri ideas to confront this big obstacle elevating the Pashtun tribes to overcome their destitution that we both have sincere intention to help.
In short, I love the land where my forefathers are buried and I love America, and both Afghan and American lives are too precious for me. That is exactly my justification to be involved and give my best for this cause.
If could be of any assistance to you, I will always be here or there to help.
Sincerely,
Khalil Nouri
Because of the demographics and the reality that everything in Afghanistan is polarized tribally, there IS only one way to create a functional government. Unite the Pashtuns. Their 40% is a lock; no other tribe comes close. If you do that, you have the space to govern. This is why Pakistan, which wants southern Afghanistan stable, backed the Taliban after the last pause in the 30 year civil war. The Taliban were and are the Pashtuns’ political vehicle.
If you don’t unite the Pashtuns, the centre cannot hold and warlords and tribal militias take over and fill the vacuum.
The US has been trying since Bush to divide the Pashtuns and rule. It’s not working. Whoever ends up the figurehead president has too bargain away too much buying the warlords’ support that the presidency has no power and the cabinet and all ministries turn into fiefdoms to be looted at will. That’s the position Karzai’s in now, but it will be the same if anyone else ends up in the same place.
Steve,
Very good point, uniting the Pashtuns is the key, but how?
The Durand line—was drawn by the Brithish more than a century ago and Pakistan’s Pashtuns feel little separates them from their Afghan cousins, and the same feeling exists on the Afghan side. The border was considered by the British as binding, by successive Afghan governments as imposed band by Pashtuns as “a line drawn on water.” Now, the first step for unification of the Pashtuns is to redraw the map of both Pakistan and Afghanistan where the Pashtuns will be unified pre the Durand treaty that was ratified 1893. In the 1950’s, the Soviets supported Afghanistan as it constantly agitated Pakistan on the question of Pashtun self-determination. In 1971, when East Pakitan broke away and became Bangladesh, Pakistani strategists faced the grim prospect of their shrinking country being squeezed between a hostile India and an expansionist, Soviet-backed Afghanistan. In that regard, the insecurity of Pakistan –a very young state—reached alarming heights. It only got worse with the Soviet Union’s increasing involvement in Afghanistan.
Nowadays, the cycle is showing almost the same but with different symptoms that Baluchistan separatists are presenting in concert with the Pashtuns mostly in FATA and NWFP dislodging acts from the Punjabi and Sindi control Pakistani government.
Once this to proceed and a the breakaways will either cause spate states or the entire Pashtun area will join Afghanistan going back to the same 1893 map. This is when we will see a true unification of the Pshtuns and then a functional government to emerge in Afghanistan.
This is a great mishmash; I can read Khalil’s article being very honest about the reality on the ground, this is mainly due to his deep understanding of Pashtun tribal politics. Also Major Gant’s passion and great work with the tribes has resulted positively in Afghanistan. This is a great teaming effort on both and eloquently to earn the respect of every tribe specially; “one at a time”, a robust and dynamic team will make a big difference. There are times that brainstorming and leaning from one another is the key to victory.
I wish you both successes.
MV
Mark,
Your valid word is very convincing.
As Henry Ford Quotes “Coming together is a beginning Keeping together is progress. Working together is success.”
I guess the distinguished major and I have been through the first phase and for the second phase, we are not there yet.
Operationally speaking, I believe the window of opportunity to gain the tribes trust per Major Gant’s doctrine is lost. Even though the U.S. is convinced to be in Afghanistan for the long haul, but still the tribes are not going to be swayed with that notion, and they will never be. Viewing this in an Afghan prospective; “foreign powers come and go” and it is a hard sell to convince the Afghans that the US is not.
Placing US internal politics to launch persuasive election campaigns, one must make every effort to sell his/her reelection agendas to inflate voting results, and that will definitely be in collision coarse with foreign politics specifically now in Afghanistan. The internal politics like to see an end to military operation and that is no good news for average honest tribal people who make the social fiber of the society in Afghanistan. Therefore, they are very much taking side towards the insurgency for a survival purposes. I hope I have proven the case that “One Tribe at a Time” cannot be won easily.
However, with our plan, there is no foreign involvement and Afghans dealing with Afghans cannot only break a better bargain than the foreign players but also convincing enough that Afghans are there to stay and live in Afghanistan. I am sure one can easily see the difference.
There is no doubt that the Major has to play it right to succeed and if he wants to comment on this he is more than welcome to do so.
Khalil
It is one thing for Westerners to believe that they must carry out a policy of “juvenization” (treating people like juveniles who need foster care)towards those who live in the nations of South Asiain; it is another for South Asians themselves to accept this kind of treatment, and therby become dependent on the handouts of westerners. I say that it is time for South Asians to stop fighting over crumbs handed to them by outsiders and begin to see themselves through the long range lense of a union of nations with a multi trillion dollar economy. If Germany and France,after centuries of animosity and warfare, can come together and become the economic engines of a European Union of nations… then Afghanistan and Pakistan can come together to become the economic engines of a South Asian union of nations. Under such a senario, areas like the Durian Line and other troublesome border regions would become special economic zones in a broader economic region. This can all happen through the concept of Biz-Jirgah to Biz-Jirgah… because there are short range goals, mid-range goals and long range goals within the Biz-Jirgah to Biz-Jirgah bottom-up approach business model. Working with the top-down business model, Biz-Jirgah’s bottom-up approach calls for tribes to work with expatriate-Afghans and with all people in the region as leaders with a focus on the future while giving great regard to the past. The future calls for a new code of mutual benefit and reconciliation just as was done between nations of Europe. However, it also calls for leadership roles for tribal elders and responsibility roles for their families. Their children will have to chart new cources in leadership to make immediate, mid-range and longrange events happen that will create a new Afghanistan, Pakistan and a broader South Asian Economic Union happen… one so dynamic that even India and Iran will want to participate (Iran in particilar would see a real carrot staring it in the face as an alternative to its current direction)
T.G.
Well done, but since you have raised such important and sensitive issues, a passing comment wouldn’t suffice – soon I’ll highlight your insights in a dedicated article on RT ‘Friendly Fire’ http://rt.com/About_Us/Blogs/friendly-fire/2010-03-16.html
Dear Colonel Evgeny Khrushchev,
I am thrilled that you are taking the time to publish an article in RT regarding this subject.
Your knowledge about Afghanistan and your desire for the betterment of the war torn country is always obvious in your articles, and I read them with keen interest.
As I said, your analysis and writings are comparable to Ustad Jalal-Udin Rumi and Omar Khyam in terms of broad meanings.
Thank you for your posting and looking forward to read your upcoming article.
Khalil
I had the opportunity to read both Mr. Nouri’s and Major Gant’s approaches.
In a native Afghan standpoint, I believe Mr. Nouri is very well aware of his norms and culture and has thorough understanding of the Pashtun tribal politics. He knows the tribulation of his Afghan symptoms. We also have a clear understanding of special operations deep study of COIN strategy.
As history thought us, Afghans have dealt with Afghans far better than foreigners dealing with Afghans. This true as that the window of opportunity is no longer available and therefore the oxygen for the Afghan solution was already sucked by the war in Iraq and the corruptions within Afghan government.
As Lord Roberts British viceroy to Kandahar recognized this when, at the end of the second Afghan war in 1880 he said, “the less they are able to see us, the less likely are to hate us…..we will have much greater chance of getting the Afghans on our side if we abstain from any interference in their internal affairs whatsoever.”
This is very obvious, and if this is not lessons learned from the British and Russians then how US Special Forces can do something that perceived to be ingenious and never applied previously? What I am reading in Major Gant’s report and as Nouri says only one small clan in Mangwal has been applied and there are no further tests on other tribes then this is just an illusionary concept that may not work.
I believe we are sinking deeper into an Afghan quagmire that the tombstone for the US is being written in the graveyard of empires.
Mr Alazar,
Thank you for your posting, you are right. Indigenous problems will be better solved locally amongst the tribes themselves and Afghans are fully aware of their own symptoms as you explained. In hindsight, the problem is that; Afghan history shows that more troops will encourage more resistance. The effect is likely to be a further degeneration of security, and a fanning of the conflict deeper into Pakistan. At the current rate of decline, support for Coalition forces will have evaporated already, leaving us with the prospect of nationwide jihad; a situation similar to that faced by the Russians and far more serious than the political movement masquerading as a religious movement that we are now facing. Unfortunately the problem in Afghanistan is not only multifaceted but multidimensional. That places the “One Tribe at a Time” at a snail’s pace against a tsunami of far exceeding decades of convoluted and intertwined crisis not only tribal or ethnical but famine, corruption, regional powers interferences, opium production, NATO and US misapprehension, and many more. Therefore, a very delicate plan readdressing the entire mentioned quandary must reflect a genuine fix. However, in the past decade of Coalition involvement in Afghanistan, there is still deep misunderstanding of the core problems.
Khalil
At the national level, US Special Forces need to stress its awareness, as most Afghans do, that Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic, not some form of displaced secular Western aspirant state. Afghans are acutely aware of this, and deeply proud of it and indeed their independence. They will not tolerate being dictated to even using one tribe against the other. As recently was evident in the Shinwari tribal feud in Negngarhar province.
Inertia within the international players, fixated as it is so often on irrelevant and actively counter-productive norms, and bound by a culture of consultancy and often ill-founded “expertise” — such as Mr. Gant who can convince Mr. McChrystal and Mr. Petraeus—is unlikely substantially to change in the short or long term.
Afghanistan has never been susceptible to interference, as opposed to advice which it readily accepted in 1950’s-1970’s.
Tinkering with action plans for reform “One Tribe at a Time” will fail unless it is fully realized that indigenous solutions that work, in however ramshackle a fashion, trump silver-plated foreign strategies every time.
Dr. Farid Khan
Birmingham, England
Dear Dr. Khan,
Thank you for your posting.
A great deal could go wrong before the favorable perceptions can be seen to have turned a genuine corner in Afghanistan. But the whole international strategy is now based on the belief that a 10 per cent increase in the objective security and economic conditions in Afghanistan could create a 50 per cent or 60 per cent shift in the public’s perception of their situation. It is probably too early to say that this is now happening. The military campaign has yet to show greater results and the Karzai government has yet to demonstrate that it can put its own house in order and deliver real benefits for the majority of Afghans.
This “One Tribe at a Time” may bear fruit but the notion has to be given further tests. I believe Mr. Gant in heart has genuine intentions and if this to produce results so be it. And if not, I am sure the “Biz Jirgah” will be placed for attest. All intentions should be focused to bring betterments for Afghanistan “Insha-Allah.”
Khalil Nouri
It is time for a UN resolution eliminating the fictitious Durand-Line
Given the example of East and West Germany, if the collapse of the Berlin Wall in the early 1990s has led to the creation of unified Germany, then why a separate state for Pashtuns could not be created by wiping out the Durand Line. “It’s a line whose time has ended November 12th 1993.” I therefore see a much harmonious region as one country of Afghanistan.
The creation of Paskistan from day one was wrong and the regional destabilization is the caused by Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan should just be bound to Punjab and Sind.
I agree with Nouri, without solving the Durand Line Jim Gant will never win the hearts and minds of the Pashtuns. They cannot see their fellow brethren on either side of the border to have more or less opportunity than one another. This is a tipping point where efforts can be futile.
Jamil Ghelzai
Kabul, Afghanistan
Take it easy, Major: you’ll make four-star general before somebody at DOD will notice that Afghanistan is America’s tar baby and the US is Pakistan’s Sugar Daddy.
Your ‘fear is that the farther down [the chain of command] the more it might be resisted by ground commanders’ was inadvertently inspired by the blind faith in the Pentagon top brass’ tacit endorsement and, as a consequence, a loss of confidence in the groundswell support of the right bottom-up initiative.
What Major Gant has failed to realize, is that the main challenge to TES will come not from the US military or Afghan/Pakistani militants, but from Afghan/American civilians, because for those folks anything ‘tribal’ spells trouble.
Gene
I believe Major Gant’s method promotes more fighting and insurgency recruitment.
However, Nouri’s proposal is the opposite; it is an advocacy for prospering tribes and bringing peace village by village, town by town and eventually city by city.
Thank you, Nouri Sahib for your wonderful thoughts.
A.Hotak,
Herat, Afghanistan
Akbar Jan Salam;
Thank you for your posting and I respect your analysis regarding Major Gant and me.
However, our approaches maybe valid and could result positively, but needles to say that our goals are tailored for the betterment of Afghanistan.
Insha-Allah, we will make every effort to help Afghanistan either in collaborative or individual approach.
However deemed to be the best suited will be approved.
Our job is to just introduce the initiatives.
Thank you and Khoda Hafez,
Khalil
Dear Khalil,
Your idea is superb, I hope that it could be executed, a true and accurate communication with respect and understanding to the Afghan villagers is crucial tough.
Dear Hasina Jan Salam;
Thank you for posting your valid comment. The villagers are easily convinced by their tribal representatives who are expatriates worldwide. They will be the ambassadors to their tribes for hope and prosperity. The fact is, the central government is not only weak but corrupt and to remain one for some time, which cannot be eradicated overnight.
Since the tribes are the only functional governance then they could individually be convinced and strike a deal by their tribal representatives better than anyone else. This is because of their lineage or family bonding, and this is how exactly is currently with the Tajik and Panshiri tribes whose representatives like for example; Fahim Khan (assistant to Karzai) who is in power and helping his Panjshiri folks. As a result, they are all prosperous and are taking advantage of any opportunity that is available to them, which obviously has tipped the balance due to favoritism.
However, the same concept could be applied to other individual tribes, but every tribe will have representative similar to Fahim Khan except being expats and given assistance through international donors outside Afghanistan. The assistance is basic necessities that will keep the tribes away joining the insurgency.