KHALIL NOURI: AFGHANISTAN: INDIGENOUS PROSPECT – THE UPCOMING US & NATO SURGE IN KANDAHAR
April 29, 2010 posted by Khalil Nouri · 31 Comments
By Khalil Nouri Staff Writer / Editor Op-Ed
Views in this article are mostly my own, few have been in conjunction with other Afghans mainly Kandaharis living inside and outside Afghanistan.
As the U.S. gears up for the operation in Kandahar the plans have hit a bit of a snag. There’s a dispute raging between the U.S. military and civilian sides of the war, believe it or not, over development aid as how to bring electricity to Kandahar. Also, as viewed by many Afghans—specifically the Kandaharis— the deeply unpopular British forces dating back from the first Afghan-Anglo war (1839), soon to lead the street fighting inside the city. In the mix of all these daunting challenges comes the “tribal power manipulation and intrigue” of the Karzai clan and family, which is a major obstacle for the upcoming operation to rid insurgency. And, it is extremely exacerbating stability in the entire Pashtun tribal structure in Afghanistan.
Operation “Omaid” (Dari and Pashto for Hope)—now revised to an unknown codename—is a military operation by international and Afghan forces, planned for June 2010, to push the Taliban out of their stronghold of Kandahar. It is part of the overall US-led strategy to end the war in Afghanistan, now in its ninth year; and is designed to steadily build momentum in the months ahead for a target U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. It will be conducted in the wake of the coalition’s offensive in Helmand Province that focused on Marja, codenamed Operation “Mushtarak” (Dari and Pashto for Together).
Despite resentment towards the operation by elders in a tribal gathering in Kandahar on April 4, NATO forces still intend to move forward and launch the mission in a few days. That said; some Afghans believe that there are culture-rooted predicaments that could cause uphill battles in the effort to win hearts and minds, and possibly cause failures for NATO in Kandahar.
DEEP BRITISH DISLIKE
For three centuries Kandahar has played a pivotal role in Afghan politics, even hosting a royal dynasty. There has always been fierce resentment towards foreign occupation; and religiously it is seen as a sacred shrine for containing the cloak of the Prophet Mohammad.
Gov. Nour Mohammad Khan-British exit Kandahar-1883
In the aftermath of a British defeat in the second Afghan-Anglo War, the city was handed under an exit accord to my great grandfather (Nour Mohammad Khan-pictured), then governor of Kandahar in 1883. Of course, he never foresaw that the British would eventually to be exiting the very same Afghan city for a fourth time; and would again be handing it over to the Afghan government; although this time as a NATO partner awaiting an end to war.
NATO foreign ministers decided last week to stage a withdrawal of British troops from districts in Helmand province; showing them on their way to Kandahar. This means that these troops could be the last to leave Afghanistan, after a new “road map” for handing over control to Afghan forces that may not include the southern volatile provinces.
However, the operation could not be more inappropriately named—with the codename “Omaid”—because Britain is strongly viewed by many Kandaharis as a powerful, manipulative, scheming and satanic nation. Any British deployment to Kandahar is likely to be met with deep local mistrust dating back to the second Afghan-Anglo War.
The Battle of Maiwand, where Afghan forces defeated the British army west of Kandahar in 1880, is one of the proudest moments for Afghans. That battle also created one of Pashtun folklore’s greatest heroines.
When Afghan lines were about to break under British fire, a young woman named “Malalai” who followed her fiancé and father who were in the Afghan army, exhorted her countrymen to fight to the last.
The tale says the Afghans rallied after she shouted: “Young love! If you do not fall in the battle of Maiwand, by God, someone is saving you as a symbol of shame!” It was Malalai’s words that gave the Afghan soldiers the motivation and spirit to continue in battle and eventually defeat the British.
Therefore, many Afghans in the South believe that revenge is the main motivation for Britain’s current involvement in Afghanistan.
If the cycle of violence is to continue, then the cause may be given in an old Hindu prayer quote requesting,”the deliverance from the venom of the cobra, the teeth of the tiger and the vengeance of the Afghan.”
That is why the insurgency in Afghanistan will continue on.
LIGHTING KANDAHAR
Although nothing in the universe can travel at the speed of light, yet we have moved in the opposite direction, or have resolved to just stand still in the effort to bring electricity to Afghanistan; and if the father of electricity Thomas Edison failed 10,000 times before he made the electric light, the West has failed right from the outset, and repeatedly over the last nine years, to turn the lights on in Afghanistan. But, why be discouraged over “spilled milk” when the window of opportunity has long gone, so let’s take a crack at it anyway!
The recent war of words between the top U.S. General in Afghanistan, Stanley McChrystal, and U.S. Ambassador to Kabul, Karl Eikenberry, over how to bring electricity to Kandahar (before the upcoming military operation takes place) has escalated to the level where people in Kandahar are overheard expressing two of their famous mythical proverbs, “Agility is the work of the devil” and “Patience is bitter, but fruit is sweet.” Both meanings are easily translated into: “Rushing is no good” and,”All things come to one who waits.” In this case, General McChrystal’s “quick fix” (buying 200 million dollars worth of generators and millions of gallons of diesel fuel) falls under the first. And Ambassador Eikenberry’s “long endurance fix” (to refurbish the existing 150 megawatts capacity hydroelectric dam “Kajaki” in Northern Helmand province) falls under the second. In hindsight, the public mood is a mix; some are in agreement and some resent both approaches.
But those in Kandahar, that I know, are not in favor of quick fixes for instant gratification; conversely, any development has to be sustained by Afghans over the long term—so do it the right way at the very outset.
However, the Western perspective and attitude appears to be, “if nice things are done for the Afghans, they will rally to us and solve our problems with diminished violence.” This is not guaranteed to work. Fiercely traditional Kandahar is the Taliban’s birthplace. Hence, membership is a family affair, and Afghans don’t turn against their own kind just because the lights stay on longer. This is the reality.
KARZAI’S “POPALZAI” CLAN HAS CAUSED AN IMBALANCE IN KANDAHAR’S TRIBAL STRUCTURE
The tribe is “the” underlying social factor, specifically in Kandahar; but its importance for Kandahar’s politics and security can be overestimated. Kandahar’s tribes are not unified political structures. However, almost all political leaders in Kandahar claim to be tribal elders. Even the half-brother to President Karzai, Ahmad Wali Karzai, insists in media interviews that he is a tribal elder. But few influential actors in Kandahar derive their influence from their position as tribal leaders. Control over guns, money, and connections to the state have become far more important. Overwhelmingly, Kandahar’s politics fuel insurgency, alienate the population from the government, and deprive the NATO operations of reliable partners.
Evidently, the Karzai family from the “Popalzai” sub-clan of “Durani” confederacy is the key to politics in Kandahar. Therefore, Ahmad Wali Karzai has, with the support of family members, built a political and commercial empire. He is now the major powerbroker to influence and undermine other tribes.
Therefore, this is the root cause of instability, and power grabbing by these means lies at the center of the intense political competition among the mentioned leading clan family and other tribes. Instead of seeking balance and stability, they [Karzai’s clan] outmaneuver their political rivals through extensive alliances to establish themselves as the undisputed leaders of the region. These schemes have far-reaching consequences and result in damaging harmony and national unity in Afghanistan.
The then leading “Mohammadzai” clan of the” Durani” confederacy—during the late King Zahir Shah and prior—was able to keep the tribal balance skillfully intact in Kandahar. This was not just because of its prominence in the collective tribal hierarchy, but also its continued minor presence in Kandahar where other tribes did not feel threatened by their existence. Whereas, now it has a disproportionate influence akin to other tribes; now all are under the influence of one clan [Karzai’s]. Again, this is a recipe for civil strife, insurgency rage and ultimately NATO’s absolute failure in Afghanistan.
KARZAI’S CONTINUED BLAME GAME WILL BE A MAJOR HURDLE FOR THE OPERATION
In a shura, or council, with tribal elders in Kandahar on April 4, the message from the tribesmen was that they are not ready for any major military assault—Mr. Karzai assured them it would not start without their support and he recognized the vast resentment for the operation. He is now sidelining himself from the complex challenges –militarily, politically and culturally—and is very much in phase with the elders. Despite the tribal resentment and Karzai’s modest position, the joint NATO and ANA operation will move forward but on the condition that the U.S. military and civilian officials cannot discuss any of the details of the pending operation except for just outlines of the offensive.
That said, if the operation were to fail, Karzai will be given credit for his attempts at harmony with the tribal elders, which would be a huge political gain for his hardball attitude towards Washington. And if it turned out to be a success, he will be declared a winner as well.
Moreover, Hamid Karzai did indirectly boost the U.S. and NATO military commanders confidence to proceed with the operation through his half-brother Ahmad Wali Karzai who (a big challenge to the operation) is the head of Kandahar’s provincial council. He openly pledged his support on April 27 (to use his influence to help secure Kandahar) for NATO operations against the Taliban.
Therefore, in case of an unsuccessful outcome to this operation, all of this intrigue could just be the behavior similar to the recent presidential election “blame game”; a “can of worms” of “he said she said” scenario, and more importantly a huge preparation for the operation’s failure.
CONCLUSION
Despite Afghanistan’s long history of decentralized power, the constitution that the United States helped craft for the post-Taliban era gives the Afghan president vast power at all levels of government. This has caused problems for the Obama administration as it has become disenchanted with Karzai and sought unsuccessfully to work around him.
In a recent damning U.S. Department of Defense document, “only a quarter of what is regards as key regions in Afghanistan support the government of President Hamid Karzai.” His reputation has drastically plummeted following repeated accusations from the U.S. and other nations that he has allowed unchecked corruption.
His ineffectiveness, corruptness and unwillingness to challenge the powerful warlords and drug lords has not only alienated a significant portion of the Afghan population but has also paralyzed his ability to govern.
Finally, of all the above factors for an unsuccessful operation in Kandahar, Karzai and his family are the main hindrances, but we Afghans believe the Afghan War is still winnable if the United States clearly and wholeheartedly redefines its mission in Afghanistan by listening to us Afghans who genuinely—applying cultural and tribal knowledge—know what will and what will not work.
Khalil Nouri is the cofounder of New World Strategies Coalition Inc., a native think tank for nonmilitary solution studies for Afghanistan. www.nwscinc.org
UNFORTUNATLY THE BRITISH HAVE STAINED EVERY CONER OF THE PLANET ….WITH THE BLOOD OF INNOCENTS …..ALL IN THE NAME OF THE UNITED KINGDOM….THEY HAVE TRIED TO SPREAD THEIR NETS WIDE AND ALLWAYS ONLY BRING HARDSHIP AND DEATH TO THE DOORS OF THE PRISTINE AND THE INNOCENT …IT IS ALL WRITEN IN THE HISTORY FOR ANYONE TO READ … THEY REALLY HAVE NO SHAME ….AND THINK THAT THEY ARE THE WORLDS SAVIOURS …. IN FACT THEY ARE PART OF THE FALL OF MANKINDS HUMAN DECENTCY ….IT IS SAD THAT SO MANY HAVE HAD TO GET INVOLVED WITH THEIR DISTORTED AND SICK BELIEFES ABOUT HOW LIFE SHOULD BE LIVED …. LIVE AND LET LIVE ….WE ALL NEED TO STOP IMPOSING OUR BELIEF’S ON OTHERS AND LET OTHERS THINK FOR THEM SELFS …..TRAVEL AROUND THE PLANET AND YOU CAN SEE HOW THE BRITS AND THE US HAVE DISTROYED EVERY CULTURE THAT WAS NOT LIKE THEIRS … THEY ARE JUST SICK WITH THEIR OWN SELF IMPORTANCE THAT THEY CAN NOT THINK CLEARLY …. LIKE A KING WITH SYPHILIS…
This is exactly why the war cannot be won, if all the positive and negative circumstances are not paid attention.
However, I am just giving the facts form the horse’s mouth [Kandaharis themselves].
Here we go again! … This Prince Harry guy does not have anything better to do but just play Cowboy and Indian game in the land where British dared to go without NATO.
This does nothing, but infuriates insurgency..
Maybe it would be better for him doing some FOX HUNTING in Windsor..
http://article.wn.com/view/2010/03/18/Prince_Harry_likely_to_return_to_Afghanistan_as_Lynx_helicop/
Khalil,
You nailed it right on the head!
Well what happens if they let him fly Apache and he kills Muslim people?
And what will that say to all the Muslims in this country!!!!
It says nothing to British Muslims as he is going out to support operations in Afghanistan, in support of the Muslim population of Afghan trying to repel the Muslim insurgents in the Taliban.
So hopefully it says to Muslims in this county that he is prepared to put his life on the line, not just for British passport holders, but for friendly nations around the world we are committed to ensuring their stability.
But I am sorry, no Muslim can buy that .. The British and Americans must rethink their positions as you said.
The British have their faults but they are not Changis Khan atleast they left behind a good railway system! Russians have always been worse conquerors. Helmand is not Grozny.
Zaman
Mr Zahin, The British are the main cause of the problem in Afghanistan by creating the Durand Line between The British India and Afghanistan.
The British presented a signed document with the person of King Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893 referring to the borders between Afghanistan and British India. This document was in English and the person of Abdul Rahman Khan did not understand the English language, therefore leads the suspicious nature of forgery and or false documentation. The Dari or Pashto translation of this document or agreement has never been signed by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, suggesting that he nullified this agreement. But the researchers have provided arguments to the contrary that this document was signed and has expired. in either scenario, the Durand line does not exist today and the agreement was nullified the day it was written..
The argument between Afghanistan and Pakistan centers on the issue of Durand Line Agreement and its validity. But, the Government of Balochistan (GOB) in Exile challenges the “legality” of the Durand Line Agreement between Afghanistan and British India in 1893, not its “validity”. We believe that the Durand Line Agreement is an illegal agreement, and therefore, it is null and void. The Durant Line separated the Pashtoon tribes from eachother just like the Berlin Wall did in Germany after the defeat of Nazis in World War II.
The British ruled parts of Afghanistan without any legal authority, but through treacherous use of a piece of paper, the Durand Line Agreement, which did not have any legal standing in any court of law. As long as the British kept Afghanistan and Balochistan in the dark and apart from each other to discuss the Agreement, the British could continue to rule Afghan territory.
But, in 1947, the British Indian government was dissolved, and hence, there was no reason for the British to continue this façade. But, Mohammad Ali Jinnah and his legal team immediately found out after Pakistan’s independence that the Durand Line Agreement was not a legally admissible/binding document. To continue the illegal occupation of territories belonging to Afghanistan, it was important for Pakistan to keep the flaw in the Agreement a secret. But, the dilemma was that Balochistan was an independent country, and one day the truth might be reveled to Afghanistan about the Agreement. This truth could result in Pakistan losing its Pashtun dominated areas to Afghanistan.
It was very important for Pakistan to either annex or invade Balochistan to continue with their illegal occupation of Afghan territories. When Jinnah failed to convince the Baloch government to annex with Pakistan on basis of the two sovereign states being predominantly Muslim countries, he ordered his armed forces to invade Balochistan and, under duress, forced the His Highness, the Khan of Kalat to sign legal documents to merge Balochistan with Pakistan. This simple act of aggression against a sovereign nation assured Pakistan that their secret about the Durand Line Agreement would remain intact.
Once Balochistan was secured, the Pakistanis deceptively used the law of uti possidetis juris to their advantage and continued occupation of territories belonging to Afghanistan.
The tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the result of the Durand Line that was created by the British,so there will never be peace among the Pashtoon tribes, divide and conquer is The British moto, but in this case it worked only on the separation of the Pashtoons.
Afghanistan and Pakistan nevr look eachother in the eye, because of the Durand Line, and Pakistan will never wish to see Afghanistan in peace, and the irony is that Pakistan is a big part of the rebuild and peace process in Afghanistan, beacuse the Bush Administration chose Pakistan as a partner by the British recommendation. There will never be peace in Afghanistan as long as Pakistan is involved as dcision maker about the future of Afghanistan.
The British built a few railroads in India, because they needed them to send home all the Indian national resouorces for free. But Ghenghez khan left the Mughal dyansty behind by his grand son Babur, that lasted for more than 200 years, and united the whole india as one prosper country, till the British came and over throwned the last Mughal king and made India the Jewel in The Crown.
Thank you Zahir Jan,
Very detailed explanation, I have to admit the fact that formation of Pakistan from day one was absolutely wrong.. Here they have created a state which is in turmoil with all its neighbors. If any peace to arrive in the Subcontinent then new Pakistan with new borders to be formed else nothing can be resolved.
Khaliljan,
The British came up with the partition of India to create a chaos in that region, just like they helped to create the state of Israel in the Middle East, to weaken the Arab nations! The war in Kashmir,and Ghaza are the best example of the British Legacy!
Mr. Zahir, to be honest the only reason the British wre able to exploit India was because so many of the MUHARAJA’S were courrupt and lazy like today’s Afghan Government.
I appreciate the detail in your answer however i fell you are making the British sound more powerful then they really are. Its America who is the real imperial power.
Mr.Zahin, what I was trying to explain that all these problems that we have in the Middle East, Afghanistan,Pakistan and India today, are the legacy of the British Empire that left behind, and ofcourse they are not as powerful as they were in 1800s, but recently they’ve joined a nother superpower, and became , a US, lapdog!
The comments and observations that follow are entirely personal opinions based on six years residence in Afghanistan and a study of the history of that country. The author has not lived in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion and does not presume to have anything other than a superficial understanding of current developments.
In a recent comment on Mr. Khalil Nouri’s paper Afghanistan: Indigenous Prospect, Mr. Zahir (May 1st, 2010) writes, “The British are the main cause of the problem in Afghanistan by creating the Durand Line…” This is an interesting view which deserves a closer look. The 1893 Agreement has been described by one British officer, diplomat, and historian (W.K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan, Oxford, 1950) as a “concrete symbol of compromise”. He goes on to say that “The Durand Line …has few advantages and many defects. It is illogical from the point of view of ethnography, of strategy and of geography. It cuts across one of the main basins of the Indus watershed, it splits a nation in two, and it even divides tribes. It is surprising that Abdur Rahman accepted such a boundary…” (p. 188). This is a view which was echoed by a great many British officers and government officials at the time.
So why did the British create a problem for themselves – the problem of the North-West Frontier of India, a problem which they handed over, unsolved, to Pakistan in 1947? It is clear that in the mid-19th century the British Government of India had two main concerns: The security of the western approaches to India and a determination not to share a common boundary in Asia with the ever-expanding Czarist Russian Empire. Afghanistan was seen by the British as a possible buffer state between two expanding empires: the British were spreading to the north-west across the sub continent, while Czarist Russia was systematically encroaching on the Central Asian Khanates and getting closer and closer to India. As a buffer state Afghanistan served British interests up until 1947 and the interests of successor Pakistan thereafter until 1979 – nearly 100 years. In other words, to return to the Durand Line, the compromise worked – not smoothly, not trouble free – but it ‘worked’.
While recognizing all the shortcomings and the unsatisfactory nature of the Durand Line, I cannot see it as “the main cause of the problem in Afghanistan” today as Mr. Zahir has stated. The period between the end of the Second World War and the Soviet invasion saw many positive social, economic, educational, and political changes in Afghanistan. These are a matter of record. Things began to go seriously wrong in 1973 when Daoud, taking advantage of the King’s absence from the country, stepped out of retirement, took over the government, abolished the monarchy, and proclaimed himself President and Prime Minister. As subsequent events showed, he should have stayed in retirement. Here we find the seeds of today’s problems in Afghanistan, which have two main causes, (1) the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, a political blunder of catastrophic proportions, and (2) a second colossal political blunder caused by short-sighted cold war attitudes, which was the failure of the U.S. and other western nations to step forward in 1989 as soon as the Soviets retreated to provide large-scale aid with a view to establishing, rebuilding, and equipping schools and hospitals, rebuilding bridges and roads, renewing aid to foster agricultural development, to help create a
peaceful environment for the establishment of a government which would encourage Afghans to return home from the Diaspora to take their places in education, medicine, engineering and other positions essential for the growth and peace of the nation. Had such aid been forthcoming in 1989 or 1990 at the latest, the civil war would have been avoided and the Taliban movement would never have got off the ground. Instead, the U.S., lacking any vision for the future of the country and satisfied to see the Soviet withdrawal, turned its back on Afghanistan, leaving a political vacuum in the country and its people at the mercy of heavily armed radical fundamentalists, many of them not from Afghanistan in the first place, who then, despite apparent complete ignorance of the teachings of Islam, and without any idea of how to establish local, let alone a national government, and lacking the skills or even the desire to serve the Afghan nation, took over and completed the destruction begun by the Soviets.
The U.S. is now paying the price of its earlier neglect of Afghanistan by waging a war against an enemy that does not wear a uniform, represents no government, and cannot be brought to sign a surrender document. Unconventional warfare has characterized every war in which the U.S. has been involved since 1945. It leads to inconclusive results and suggests that there is no military solution to either the situation in Iraq or Afghanistan. Realizing this after ten years of warfare in Afghanistan the Soviets simply walked away, leaving a mess of their own making behind.
In their invasion of Afghanistan the Soviets confirmed cold war suspicions. They were the “bad guys”, while the U.S. basked in the warmth of a self satisfied image of themselves as the “good guys”. And yet, only a few years later, thanks to the unprincipled, unscrupulous, ignorant character of G.W.Bush and D. Cheney, the U.S. was led by lies, secrecy, and false ‘intelligence’ into a senseless, pointless, unnecessary war in Iraq, just as the Soviets had been led into Afghanistan by the tragic miscalculations of Leonid Brezhnev. Neither Bush nor Brezhnev realized that the only way to learn from history is to read it.
Dr. Schuyler Jones
May 5th, 2010
The Durand Line has been a source of contention between Afghanistan and Pakistan. On September 30, 1947, at the UN General Assembly meeting, Afghanistan even caste a vote against the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations.
International Law states that boundary changes must be made among all concerned parties; and a unilateral declaration by one party has no effect. So, when in 1949, Afghanistan’s “Loya Jirga” (Grand Council) declared the Durand Line Agreement invalid, it was considered a unilateral declaration, and therefore, could not be enforced. Furthermore, Durand Line, like virtually any international boundaries, has no expiration date, nor is there any mention of such in the Durand Line Agreement, which is contrary to the popular beliefs of certain Afghan scholars that the Agreement lapsed in 1993 which is after a hundred years of its signing.
To this date, the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are characterized by rivalry, suspicion and resentment. The primary cause of this hostility rests in the debate about the validity of the Durand Line Agreement. But, so far, it appears that Pakistan’s position in this debate is legally correct, and the Government in Afghanistan has never challenged Pakistan in the International Court of Justice.
Need less to say that, how much Afghans are fond of the Pakistan goernemnt, and especially the Pashtoons who have families on both side of the border,because of the Durant Line. Since 1980s Pakistan has recruited, brainwashed, trained and financed the young Afghans to become Jihadists. The government of Pakistan built more than 20000 Madrassas with the Saudi’s money to brain wash the young muslims from around the world to become terrorists, and the result of their desructions in Afghanistan, and towards the western world and the US, is on the news everyday.
I do agree with you that the United States of America left Afghanistan to the wloves, after the Russian army left Afghanistan, a country without any oil was not important to the US government anymore, and they lost interest in Afghanistan, but the result was the tragedy of 911, and after the US forces over thrown Taliban government in 2001, instead of cleaning the country from Talibans and insurgency, they started a wrong war in Iraq, and focuesd their attention on Iraq,they failed again,in Afghanistan because of the strong return of The Talibans.
The US, and the coalition forces’ military campaign in Afghanistan has not worked, since 2001, to establish an stable government in Afghnistan, especially after the US became a partner with Pakistan that never want peace in Afghanistan to start with, the result has been a chaos.
Right on! We used the quote of Malalai to open one of our award winning broadcasts in the mid-1980s on the anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in VOA/Pashto. The Soviets did not understand the Kandaharis either. But it is difficult for the “West” to understand how people (Kandaharis) can harbor a distrust for the British for more than a hundred years. We have short memories but as another Pashto proverb goes (approximately): If you take vengeance in this generation, you are over anxious.
And we have a tendency not to listen to the “locals” when their statements do not agree with what we are planning. It happened in 02 with our promised but short-lived Marshal Plan-level reconstruction effort when the farmers of central Helmand were telling us what was needed to end opium poppy cultivation…and we still dont listen, which has resulted in the well entrenched opium trade, government corruption, “Taliban” revival, etc etc. During that first year, with complete local government and local police cooperation and involvement, lots of talk, and putting several thousand farmers to work on their irrigation system for pay ($1.75 a day)we reduced opium poppy cultivation in Nad-i-Ali (some 30,000 acres of irrigated land) by 85% in that one crop year before our funding was cut just before the following planting season, and the farmers returned to poppy. (see my website for details) We must learn to listen…as your well written article points out.
Kandahar? I would not go there. (Advice)
Scott,
As a Westerner you seem to have a profound grasp of Afghanistan and my hats off for you sir!
What I see here; is hard to distinguish the right advice about Afghanistan from just about anyone nowadays. The Beltway policy advisors and even local Afghans are not really in phase with genuine solution or profound knowledge of the area.
Bush administration chose their viceroy an Afghan born name Zalmay Khalilzad to make the call, and he by manipulation ended up choosing Karzai instead of the popular people who knew all the ropes about Afghanistan. Conversely, one can make the assertion as where do I place myself amongst the category of valid thinkers? That is where the catch is; Afghanistan needs some anthropologists, historians and people who genuinely think and advice the right way.
If you ask an advice of a warlord or a drug baron which we have so far, we will end up in a dark alley. And the result is what we are seeing now. It is still heading the wrong way but some change or grasp in Western thinking has been shown that tribes are the key to solving the quagmire in Afghanistan.
For you to go to Kandahar, my advice would be to have a reliable s
ecurity or be embedded with some military units. I have gone and will go again without a trace, because my tribe is very much my security, however, it depends how much trust you have in the people who are providing security for you.
Please let me know if I can be of any help.
Khalil
dang nice story dude.
Thanks limewire
Khalil
Recently British found their 1880 Battle of Maiwand rifles under the rubble in Helmand Province.
In next 100 years they are going to come again to Afghanistan and find the weapons of today.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/soldiers-in-helmand-unearth-british-rifles-lost-in-1880-massacre-842497.html
No, Hamed! it will never happen for the British to come again in Afghanistan, but yet we had said the same for the past 140 years.. and now the 4th time..
However, frankly if Britain had taken a neutral position during the U.S. operation in Afghanistan .. and not being part of NATO coalition then I blieve the war could have had a slight different picture …. the past memories of the Anglo-Afghan war pours salt on Afghan wounds .. This is just in MHO ..
I have read this article and it reminded me of another article i read today in The Guardian about RAWA on of their activist is quoted as saying “There are three enemies in this country: The Taliban, the [former mujahideen commanders] and the Karzai government, and foreign troops. All three of them commit crimes against our people. “When the froeign troops go, we will only have two left to deal with.”
I recommend that you read the rest of the article in The Guardian.
I am a regular reader of Mr. Nouri’s work.
Zaman
Thank you Zaman Sahib;
They are very valid points and I am completely in phase with your thoughts. Of course, a nonaligned, autonomous and prosperous Afghanistan is the dream for every true Afghan, as you proved to be one yourself.
That said, and now that you have introduced the list for purging all those harmful elements, then a prioritization of such doctrine should be placed on the table.
Firstly and above all, I believe a new U.S. policy with different approaches is the key to the solution. The U.S. should recognize that it has gone and still going in the wrong path and therefore make the necessary adjustments to quickly fit the exact need for Afghanistan. Evidently what works and what does not is already clear by now. Another words the frame work to make the changes has already surfaced in this last 9 years of NATO occupation of Afghanistan.
For example; in conjunction with the UN and its full support; a change of constitution is vital and to be introduced by tossing the futile presidential election that does not work, costly and may cause civil strife. Finally get rid of the current insufficient Afghan government, and from your list, the rest to follow.
I don’t see any other alternative..
Khalil
I have to mention I saw the end of Rambo III last night on TV. Blood soaked American propaganda from Reagan’s 80′s. The Afghan characters in the film talk about how Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, the British and now those horrible commie Russians have all failed to break the spirit of the Afghan people (Stallone’s script, not mine). The film ends with the line: “Dedicated to the gallant people of Afghanistan”
You could not make this stuff up!
Khalil,
Our engagement in Afghanistan is a disaster that has achieved nothing and is going nowhere. Everyone knows this to be true, especially the politicians. The fact that none feel able to say so is symptomatic of what is wrong with politics today.
Your notion of British dislike is irrelevant because without British presence it is a failed state.
Debbie
Manchester, UK
Ms. Meaker,
I am glad you are admitting the fact that militarily Afghanistan is an unwinnable war.
As for the relevance if British either being liked or disliked by the Afghans; it would be sufficed if you or the British government to take a populace survey in Afghanistan and come up with final determination whether it is true or not. I am confident for the assessment I made in my article is due to my understanding by being present on the ground and intensely involved with my fellow Afghans.
By the way, would you be happy if Britain was invaded 4 times throughout the one half century?
I like to see your answer on that.
Thank you,
Khalil Nouri
Afghanistan is proving the quagmire for the Americans that it has been for every invader of the last couple of hundred years. What seemed like an easy victory for the dim-witted George W has turned into a vast black hole for money the US doesn’t have and for the lives of hundreds of thousands of Afghanis and thousands of Americans.
As the Russians re-assert control over the satellites that have for centuries been a part of the Russian sphere of influence, the adventure in Afghanistan cannot even deliver reliable control of those to the US, which was one of the principal reasons for the invasion in the first place.
All in all, the invasion has not made the world a safer place; If anything it has made it far more unstable. It has not delivered the kind of control over the Caspian Sea region that the US was so keen to get and it has consumed vast quantities of cash and destroyed the people and the infrastructure of another country.
Khalil,
I see the picture of your Grandfather, and it resembles a very different time back then in Afghanistan.
I bet they had better understanding of the people and government than nowadays.
Janet,
The actual picture that I have is dated June, 1883 .. Which is about three years post second Afghan-Anglo war.
I believe it was still a turmoil but you are right; far better than now ..
Years of war, Afghanistan has descended back into earlier centuries..
Dear Mr. Nouri:
Your articles are important, and pertinent. The issues raised here by other commenters such as Zahir and Scott are also valid with regards to the Durand Line, the opportunity to address the poppy cultivation issue in Helmand early on etc etc.
What is so tragic is the way NATO/ISAF implements “COIN” strategy that is neither strategically, nor even operationally, sound nor will effect some sort of permanent peace in the area. Instead, they seem to be haphazardly undertaking “reconstruction and stabilization” without a thoughtful consideration of the consequences of said action(s). They are blindly throwing millions of $$ on hairbrained “solutions” like buying diesel operated generators for Kandahar (as mentioned above)as though these will “buy” off the populace’s growing discontent/unease over having so many feringhees on their soil. Not to mention an unelected Emperor in Kabul whom these feringhees support!! Seems so deja vu in that like Shah Shuja, Karzai wouldn’t last a day without the physical presence of the feringhee forces.
Personally, I think it is time for either drastic measures or a complete rapid pull out. What I fear is who will benefit benefit from a compete withdrawal: Pakistani state apparatus, Taliban Central and their paymasters.
Dear Dr. Burki,
Thank you for posting in our blog, and hope to see you more in our international discussions about Afghanistan.
I confer with you in those important points. As for the COIN strategy, which I had a little emphasis in my article, seems to make little effect in the current setup.
As we all know, Afghanistan being a predominantly conservative Muslim state and many times I have heard from the average Afghans that this is a challenge to our religion, norms and culture. The NATO brasses are in the impression that this is a public service and protecting the population from insurgency and yet the population is highly skeptical of the free roaming around of foreign troops in their cities, towns and villages.
Here, I believe I am seeing a disconnect between the populace and NATO. People are very much in favor of sealing the Porous Afghan-Pakistani border rather than the notion of being protected by foreign forces.
There are many futile issues that may not bear fruit in current setup, and therefore a thorough reassessment must be in place for correcting those errors. This also applies in the lucrative narcotic trafficking by notorious warlords who are or were in CIA payroll and benefiting hugely.
Dear Mr. Nouri:
Dear Dr. Burki-
You bring up a good point about Pakistan and Taliban Central benefitting from U.S. extraction. A few thoughts:
TALIBAN WOULD LOVE IT, BUT…
An immediate U.S. withdrawal would greatly please the Taliban right now from a PR standpoint. However, they will miss the U.S./Karzai corruption, incompetence and inability to truly protect anyone, because it’s been one of their greatest recruiting tools to date. I think a phased U.S. withdrawal done correctly, with the right new strategy put in place will benefit Afghanistan. I think networks of like-minded tribal leaders provided with enough guns and money will be a more effective approach- so the Taliban might be kicking themselves once U.S. leaves, ironically.
PAKISTAN & TALIBAN – NATURAL ALLIES
I think the Pakistan government and its military leadership are caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, they would like to see the U.S. withdraw and Afghanistan fall into the hands of the Afghan Taliban – who’ve they’ve indirectly and directly supported for years. One could say the ISI, Musharaff and Pakistani madrassas gave birth to the Taliban movement (but many of you no doubt know this).
ANYBODY BUT INDIA
Also, Pakistan fears a Karzai-led regime because they want to avoid any arrangement where their mortal enemy India might play any type of role – which is the #1 issue that seems to drive ALL of their foreign policy decisions. If Karzai remains, India will have major influence in Kabul- or at least more influence than Pakistan. India has sunk more money in development aid into Afghanistan than nearly everyone outside of the U.S. An Indian role is a totally unacceptable and unthinkable situation to Pakistan.
YET, PAKISTAN SHALL REAP A WHIRLWIND…
However, on the other hand, the Pakistan govt, military and ISI don’t want to lose their grip on power in their own country, to their own version of the Taliban problem – the Tehrik-e-Taliban. They’re playing a dicey game here. Pakistani leaders love power more than Islam.
Ahmed Rashid pointed out to me once how Musharaff, for example, isn’t as a devout a Muslim as many folks think. He used Islamic extremism as a tool, but didn’t really abide by it himself. Now his “tool” has come home to roost. Thus, we have this “frankensteinian” scenario coming back to haunt the Pakis as they are now reaping what they sowed. (I wrote about this irony last May in an article entiled “Exposing Pakistan: terrorist incubator since 1947).
http://www.examiner.com/x-4454-Geopolitics-Examiner~y2009m5d27-Exposing-Pakistan-terrorist-incubator-since-1947
It is a maddening foreign policy to be supporting one version of the Taliban on the Afghan side of the border and then directly fighting another within your own. Logic dictates that it is impossible for both objectives to succeed. So, nothing looks appealing to Pakistan at this point.