Unpacking Anti-Muslim Brotherhood Discourse

Wall graffiti in reference to the media propaganda in Egypt. Image originally post to Flicker by Gigi Ibrahim
Wall graffiti in reference to the media propaganda in Egypt. Image originally post to Flicker by Gigi Ibrahim
Wall graffiti in reference to the media propaganda in Egypt. Image originally post to Flicker by Gigi Ibrahim

by Mohamad Elmasry, jadaliyya.com


Noam Chomsky’s Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda argues that effectively crafted and controlled media messages can turn otherwise rational people into “hysterical” warmongers. Chomsky’s analysis focuses on how western governments and elite-led media in democratic societies have successfully employed propaganda campaigns to achieve political aims. Egypt has experienced its own propaganda program in recent months. What is perhaps unique about Egypt’s propaganda campaign is that it is an anti-government campaign initiated by a diverse group of oppositional forces.

In post-revolution Egypt–which is, perhaps, not actually as “post” revolution as many think–Hosni Mubarak-era media owners, Mubarak regime loyalists, and key members of Egypt’s liberal and secular opposition have teamed up to create arguably one of the most effective propaganda campaigns in recent political history. In a matter of months, these forces have managed to demonize Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, from which Morsi hails, to the extent that many Egyptians openly call for the overthrow of the democratically elected government and the imprisonment of Brotherhood members. Brotherhood members have also been the victims of systematic violence–which has included the live burning of Muslim Brotherhood youth, the killings of Brotherhood members, and the arsons of Muslim Brotherhood buses and offices across Egypt. Government buildings have also been vandalized, and the presidential palace and other government buildings were set ablaze by firebomb-hurling youth in December.

Since inheriting Egypt’s mess of an economy and myriad environmental, health, transportation, education, and energy crises, Morsi and the Brotherhood have made some progress on several political fronts. They have also made mistakes, which have included releasing reckless statements about women, failing to share enough political decision making with liberals, and mishandling political crises surrounding the Ethiopian Dam project, Morsi’s controversial November decree, and the appointment of a hardline Islamist as governor of Luxor, among other things. I would argue, however, that none of their mistakes warrant systematic demonization, terrorism, or overthrow. There is a massive disconnect between the Brotherhood’s mishandlings and the reaction that they instigated, thanks to the propaganda that the Brotherhood’s challengers have spread.

As someone who has studied discourse for eleven years, the anti-Brotherhood, anti-Morsi propaganda is unlike anything I have ever seen, primarily because news reporters and organizations–rather than political figures–seem to spearhead the propaganda efforts. The lack of objectivity in Egyptian news is perhaps unsurprising, given the reality that many Egyptian journalists perceive themselves more as political activists than as watchdogs, and other research suggesting that Egyptian journalism suffers from an overall lack of professionalism. The opposition’s propaganda machine–aided by a plethora of private television networks and newspapers owned by Mubarak-friendly businessmen like Ahmad Bahgat, Salah Diab, and Mohamed al-Amin–has successfully manufactured discourses designed to designate the Brotherhood and Morsi as lacking in basic integrity and unworthy of political participation. To be sure, Islamist media, having begun in recent years to discuss politics on otherwise exclusively religious satellite television channels, dish out their own fair share of propaganda. Their political impact, however, pales in comparison with independent news outlets that are devoted to political news reportage, have greater reach, can boast well known commentators, and that proclaim the goal of covering political affairs in an objective manner.

Relatively greater levels of professionalism at some news outlets (and by a handful of television news personalities) notwithstanding, the anti-Brotherhood bias in independent Egyptian news media is obvious and overwhelming. As part of a pre-reading of Egyptian news broadcasts designed to develop a coding scheme for an upcoming research project, I watched the 25 March 2013 episode of OnTv’s From Anew. The program featured nine consecutive anti-Islamist guests over a period of about seventy-five minutes. Such blatant imbalance is not uncommon. Frequently, talk shows–such as OnTv’s Respectable People and From Anew, and CBC’s From the Capital and As Clear as the Sun–invite multiple guests, all of the same anti-Islamist persuasion, for lengthy discussions of political events. Other programs, such as Wael Al-Ibrashi’s The 10 p.m. Show on the Dream Network and Ibrahim Isa’s From Cairo on the al-Qahira wa-al-Nas network, I would argue, have blatantly one-sided slants, as evidenced by their story ideation, guest selection, and interview questioning processes. One of the few independent news stations in Egypt that consistently tries to provide some balance and debate is Al Jazeera Live Egypt. Because the channel usually features the Brotherhood perspective alongside that of the opposition, critics often call it “Al Jazeera Muslim Brotherhood.”

One consistent discourse that has emerged in recent months in Egypt defines the Muslim Brotherhood as un-Egyptian, and caring more about their own narrow agenda than the country’s national interests. For example, reports routinely claim that Morsi is not a president for all Egyptians, but rather only for his Islamist comrades. Other reports discuss the Muslim Brotherhood’s relationship with Hamas, and their desire to sell off parts of Egypt to foreign countries. A 30 May 2013 article in online newspaper: 24 summarized novelist and political commentator Gamal al-Ghitani’s views on Brotherhood politics in its headline, which read: “Gamal al-Ghitani: The Brotherhood are a foreign organization and their rule of Egypt constitutes a foreign occupation.” On 21 June 2013 al-Ghitani appeared on the OnTv program The Complete Picture boasting that he began writing about the “occupation” thesis last summer, immediately after Morsi’s election. For weeks in early 2013, President Morsi’s office and the Qatari government were forced to fend off baseless rumors–given major attention on television news and in newspapers–that deals were in place for Egypt to lease the Pyramids and sell the Suez Canal to Qatar.

This discourse—that the Brotherhood are not true Egyptians and do not have Egypt’s best interests at heart—is used to justify sub-discourses about the Muslim Brotherhood. Those include discourses that the Brotherhood is occupying all state institutions, produced a catastrophically bad constitution that suits only its own interests, and intimidates and kills the opposition with its “militias.” The next few sections will examine these discursive sub-constructions contributing to the anti-Brotherhood, anti-Morsi fervor in Egypt.

The “Brotherhoodization” of the State

A dominant theme in Egyptian media and political discourse argues that the Muslim Brotherhood is bent on occupying all state institutions and hoarding power. This “brotherhoodization” (“akhwana,” in Arabic) thesis dovetails nicely with other discourses about the Brotherhood’s alleged desire to sell off Egypt and its disloyalty to the nation.

The akhwana (brotherhoodization) thesis is the most damning, and oft repeated, of all anti-Brotherhood discourses. It has become so hegemonic that many Egyptians take it as a given. It is difficult to find an independent talk show that does not regularly obsess over the Brotherhood’s takeover, a topic which opposition figures often use as a political battle cry. Some western news outlets have also reported uncritically about the alleged Brotherhood takeover. I would argue that the “brotherhoodization” thesis holds very little weight, if any at all.

Opposition forces in Egypt claim that, having secured the presidency, the Brotherhood has moved to take over various government ministries, the judiciary, the armed forces, the media, and other aspects of Egyptian society and culture. The opposition points to Morsi’s administrative appointments and the domination of the constitutional assembly.

Lost on those who advance the “brotherhoodization” thesis is the fact that the Brotherhood has won multiple free and fair elections and thus has the political and democratic right to control at least part of the government until their term expires. Also lost on people is the fact that the new Egypt will experience regular elections, as stipulated by the constitution, and whoever wins elections after the Brotherhood will have the similar chance to hold sway. This is how democratic politics works: groups who win elections have the right to govern for a few years, implementing their political program along the way. In the United States, it is hardly controversial that the two major parties vie to control both the executive and legislative branches of government. In fact, it is seen as an admirable goal for any given party that believes its program is the most suited to serve the country’s well being. Interestingly, a 2000 Wall Street Journal survey of political science, law, and history professors concluded that–according to respondents–many of the most productive presidents in US history had control of both the executive and legislative branches of government for the entirety of their terms in office.

The United States and arguments about the relative merits of divided versus unified control of government aside, it remains that the Brotherhood does not have, and will not have, a stronghold on the Egyptian state. First, the Brotherhood does not control the army, and it would be impossible for them to do so in the foreseeable future. For starters, it would be unconstitutional and illegal for the president or anyone else to install Muslim Brotherhood members as high-ranking army officers. Even in Egypt, such appointments can only occur naturally and with requisite qualifications and years of experience. Not surprisingly, there has been no indication that anyone inside the presidency or the Brotherhood is attempting to commit such a gross violation.

The situation is similar with respect to the judiciary, which is also subject to a formal system of appointment that depends on qualifications and experience. Brotherhood opponents have, however, criticized the Islamist-dominated Shura Council’s proposal to reduce the retirement age for judges from seventy to sixty. Critics say the judicial authority bill could give the Brotherhood a chance at padding the judiciary with its loyalists, while Shura Council members say that the bill is necessary to purge the judiciary of judges loyal to Mubarak. The deposed president had gradually increased the retirement age from sixty to seventy in order keep judges loyal to him active. In any case, the argument that the Brotherhood could use the law as a means to “Brotherhoodize” the judiciary is unconvincing for two reasons. First, the Brotherhood does not have a community of potential loyal judges who are ready for promotion. Second, the new age limit would apply equally to all judges and not favor Islamists over liberals.

The intimation that the Brotherhood controls the interior ministry is similarly out of place. If it was not initially clear that the interior ministry was, and is, controlled by most of the same faces that controlled it during the Mubarak era, it should be now. There is fervent anti-Brotherhood sentiment within the police and security forces, who in recent months have protested against the Brotherhood, organized strikes against Morsi, and–in spite of repeated anti-Brotherhood arsons–have refused to protect the Brotherhood headquarters from angry protesters. Morsi and the Brotherhood can be criticized for not doing more to purge the ministry now–indeed, the merits of a gradualist strategy are debatable–but the Brotherhood’s more gradual approach to purging the ministry cannot also be the subject of a “brotherhoodization” argument.

In government, even after recent Morsi appointments, only ten out of a total twenty-seven governors and eleven of thirty-five cabinet members hail from the Muslim Brotherhood. The opposition is up in arms at these ratios, but it is both logical and fair for an elected president faced with repeated attempts to remove him from power to rely on governors and cabinet members who are loyal to him. And, at any rate, thirty-five percent representation is hardly excessive for a ruling party. Moreover, and importantly, Morsi has offered numerous government positions to opposition politicians, but they have declined for various reasons. Some simply have not wanted to affiliate themselves with a Brotherhood government. Others have declined because of fears that it would be difficult to engage in substantive work given the extreme anti-Brotherhood program ongoing in Egypt. Vice President of the liberal Ghad al-Thawra Party, Mohamed Mohie El-Din, confirmed to me in a 23 June telephone interview that Ayman Nour, who heads the Ghad al-Thawra Party, has been offered the position of Prime Minister on several different occasions since the start of the Morsi presidency. Also, April 6 Movement founder Ahmed Maher was offered the position of presidential advisor, and declined. On 4 July 2012, just days after Morsi took over as president, former presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabbahi acknowledged on Mahmoud Saad’s talk show Akher al-Nahar that Morsi offered him the position of Vice President. Sabbahi, too, declined. Prime Minister Hesham Kandil, who is not himself a member of the Muslim Brotherhood or any Islamist party, has said on multiple occasions, including most recently in a televised interview on 21 June 2013, that he has offered numerous ministerial posts to opposition figures. Most have declined, with some indicating they might accept a post when “things calm down.” Morsi’s 26 June 2013 national address also mentioned that non-Brotherhood ministers from the previous government had been given the chance to stay on the job, but declined. Given that non-Brotherhood politicians have regularly rejected participation in government, it is anything but surprising that President Morsi has found little choice but to tap Brotherhood members for government posts.

The “brotherhoodization” argument picked up steam in mid-November 2012, when liberal members of the constituent assembly withdrew from the assembly citing what they called the Muslim Brotherhood’s inordinate influence on the constitution drafting process. Those who complain that the Brotherhood dominated the drafting of the new constitution overlook the fact that Egypt’s constituent assembly was formed by a democratically elected parliament, and that twenty-two Egyptian parties—which formed the near entirety of Egypt’s political spectrum (at that time)—signed off on the basic composition of the constituent assembly in June 2012. Interestingly, current hardline opposition and al-Wafd Party leader al-Sayed al-Badawi led the press conference announcing the agreement on the breakdown of the assembly. The agreement dictated that the assembly would give thirty-nine out of one hundred total assembly seats to members of parliament, with these seats being divided up according to parliamentary proportions. The remaining sixty-one seats would be divided amongst scholars of constitutional law, al-Azhar University and Church representatives, and various labor and social groups. Because some of the sixty-one non-parliamentary seats could go to individuals affiliated with political parties and movements, the agreement further outlined the ways in which these seats would be divided up, according to Mohie El-Din, who was a member of the assembly. He said it was agreed that the final one hundred-member assembly was to include thirty-two members of the Muslim Brotherhood, eighteen members of al-Nour Party, eighteen representatives of “the state,” and thirty-two liberal party members. This specific breakdown was designed to give fifty seats to Islamists and fifty seats to non-Islamists, Mohie El-Din told me. However, since some of the eighteen “state” representatives (for example al-Azhar University scholars) could reasonably be considered “Islamists” (depending on how the term is defined), the agreement dictated, in practical terms, that more than fifty percent of committee members would be of “Islamist” persuasion, Mohie El-Din said. In other words, Islamist currents may have enjoyed a majority inside the Constituent Assembly and its committees, but the important point is that all of this was specified, understood, and agreed to by all twenty-two parties, despite what the opposition now claims.

It is plausible that many of the liberal parties viewed these proportions as relatively favorable, since it is likely that a national referendum would have yielded a much higher number of Brotherhood members. The Brotherhood-led coalition had, after all, won forty-seven percent of parliamentary seats in Egypt’s first post-revolution democratic elections, with an additional twenty-five percent of seats going to the more conservative Salafist coalition. It is not ideal for popular parties to have significant representational advantages in constitution drafting assemblies, and scholars such as Linz and Stepan have argued that majoritarian rules are unhealthy for constitution building, while also acknowledging that the practice has been prevalent (p. 83). As scholars Patrick Fafard and Darrel Robert Reid note in their Constituent Assemblies: A Comparative Survey, constituent assemblies are usually governed by the rules of “partisan politics.” The researchers posit: “It has generally been assumed and accepted that the political and economic elites who dominate the political process will exercise a similar dominance in the process of drafting or amending the constitution” (p. 22). Discussing the example of the United States, Fafard and Reid note that, “proceedings of the Philadelphia Convention itself were characterized by a remarkable federalist consensus throughout” (p. 26).

The fact that some non-Islamists withdrew from the Egyptian constituent assembly is undeniably problematic. Some of the liberal members of the assembly undoubtedly had legitimate concerns about some of the document’s articles. However, they withdrew before exhausting discussion, and refused to return to the assembly after repeated official invitations to come back for discussion of contentious articles. More damning, perhaps, for non-Islamist claims of an unfair constitution building process, is that many of the assembly’s liberals seemed to abandon the process early on, and well before it was exhausted.  For instance, according to Mohie El-Din, some members of the assembly seemed bent on withdrawing from the outset. “We had [non-Islamist] people who withdrew upon entering the assembly. [Their attitude seemed to be,] ‘Good morning, we withdraw,’” said Mohie El-Din, in a 20 December debate held on the campus of the American University in Cairo. Mohie El-Din also claimed that many of the non-Islamists who withdrew were systematically absent from assembly sessions throughout the process of drafting the document. He said that he was sometimes the only non-Islamist representative in attendance. During other sessions, liberal assembly members would only show up for “ten minutes” before exiting. “Can you, given these circumstances, say that you have had an influence? Of course not,” Mohie El-Din said.

Also, some of the complaints of inordinate Islamist influence over the document’s content are ill conceived. For example, liberals have criticized Article 4, which gives Al-Azhar oversight on matters pertaining to Islamic law. What many overlook, though, is that this article was a liberal suggestion. The thinking of liberals inside the assembly may have been that al-Azhar would be a safeguard against the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and more conservative Salafists. Islamists in the Constituent Assembly agreed to Article 4, and other proposals submitted by non-Islamist representatives. For example, an article about religious freedoms specifically requested by the assembly’s four Church representatives was included as is, word for word, said Mohie El-Din at the AUC debate. The article was not removed, and no one suggested it be removed or edited, even after the Church representatives withdrew from the assembly, he said.

An overwhelming majority of voters (sixty-four percent) approved Egypt’s new constitution despite hysterical propaganda against the assembly and the document, which included the distribution of fake constitutional drafts. Importantly, a national dialogue held in January announced that Morsi had agreed to form a pluralistic committee to revise controversial articles in the constitution. Many key members of Egypt’s liberal opposition have rejected dialogue and Morsi’s proposal to revise the constitution, however, and have instead insisted on pursuing their ongoing “rebel” campaign, which aims to remove Morsi from power, select a new constituent assembly, and draft a new constitution. The National Salvation Front, the largest and most organized opposition bloc, has refused any dialogue with the president until all of their preconditions – the sacking of the Prosecutor General, an independent committee to revise the constitution, and a national unity government – are met.

The Muslim Brotherhood “Militias”

The Mubarak regime consistently propagated talk of “Muslim Brotherhood militias.” Such claims have increased since Morsi took power, as newspaper headlines and television news talk shows have casually and matter-of-factly discussed the “Brotherhood militias.”

When, in isolated instances, individual Brotherhood members have responded in kind to anti-Brotherhood violence (in ways that the Brotherhood has later condemned in official statements), the violence has been immediately attributed to the “Brotherhood militias.” The claim that the Muslim Brotherhood maintains so-called militias, however, is unconvincing. For one, if the Brotherhood really had militias, why did it not deploy them during Mubarak’s rule, or during the violent stages of the 2011 eighteen-day uprising?  Why has the Brotherhood not relied on these “militias” to prevent the burning of thirty of its offices in late 2012?

The events of the past year indicate that the Brotherhood has often been the victim, rather than the instigator, of violence. In all, thirty Muslim Brotherhood offices have been set ablaze or destroyed, and some members of the Brotherhood have been killed or burned alive. Graphic images of anti-Brotherhood violence, and evidence of what has transpired in recent months, has prompted even some liberals to acknowledge, finally, that the Brotherhood “militias” do not exist. Liberal activist and writer Mahmoud Salem, known as Sandmonkey in the social media world, was one of the first liberals to publicly acknowledge this reality in a 26 March 2013 Daily News Egypt article. He wrote the following about what he called the “myth” of Muslim Brotherhood militias: “From everything we have seen in every major clash with the MB and its members, this myth is also simply false. The MB is organized and can mobilize its members, but its members are mostly educated middle class and are not trained in militant warfare.”

It is worth nothing that Salem’s “myth” article came in the aftermath of violent 22 March protests organized outside the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in al-Muqattam. During these clashes, the Brotherhood, again, suffered major casualtiesone hundred seventy six injuries, twenty six of them serious, and one fatality–as they attempted to protect their headquarters, after police appeared unable or unwilling to do so. Playing a key role in the al-Muqattam protests was political activist Ahmed Douma, who said on multiple occasions prior to the 22 March clashes that burning down Muslim Brotherhood offices is a “revolutionary act.”

What is arguably most troubling about the anti-Brotherhood violence is the callousness with which at least some supporters of the opposition discuss these events, sometimes suggesting that Brotherhood members deserve violent treatment. I recall a widely circulated photo of a Muslim Brotherhood activist set ablaze, his upper body completely on fire. Many Egyptians praised and joked about the incident in the comment field below the photo on Facebook, and some circulated a “Muslim Brotherhood: before and after” photo mocking the burned activist. It is important to note that the 2011 uprising against the Mubarak regime was, with some rare exceptions, overwhelmingly nonviolent. After Mubarak’s ouster, both liberal and Islamist revolutionaries credited the peaceful nature of the protesters as one mark of the revolution’s greatness. In a short period of time, some in Egypt have become convinced that violence against an elected president and ruling political group is legitimate.


Anti-Muslim Brotherhood propaganda may be the result of a concerted effort by media tycoons unfriendly to the Brotherhood, a consequence of decades of anti-Brotherhood fear mongering, or both. The general lack of professionalism that plagues much of Egyptian journalism–something which I discussed at length in my dissertation research in 2009, and which helps create a systematically imbalanced discussion–almost certainly plays a key role.

In any case, what becomes clear from any serious reading of Egyptian politics is that there are groups in Egypt–Mubarak regime remnants, media figures, and members of the opposition–that refuse to let the Brotherhood rule the country. It is true that anti-Brotherhood sentiment has increased in recent months, and that Morsi’s politics have turned off many Egyptians. It is also true, however, that Morsi’s mistakes have been exaggerated and, importantly, that there were many Egyptians not prepared–from the start–to accept a democratic Egypt ruled by Islamists. Here, it is important to note that the first arsons of Brotherhood offices occurred well before Morsi’s controversial 22 November decree, which lasted all of eighteen days and has been exaggerated by the opposition. It is also worth noting that calls for a new “revolution” began last August, just two months after Morsi took power and when his approval rating was higher than seventy percent; and that members of Egypt’s opposition, including 2012 presidential candidates Hamdeen Sabbahi and Amr Moussa, have been calling for an early end to Morsi’s term since last summer–just after they lost the presidential race. Indeed, it seems some in Egypt’s opposition were ready to move away from Brotherhood rule almost as soon as it began.

At best, the Muslim Brotherhood is struggling to solve Egypt’s myriad problems, simultaneously battling thugs in the street, a seditious opposition, corruption in the judiciary, and a state that is in shambles at many levels. At worst, they are incompetent rulers. Even if the incompetence theory proves true, the Brotherhood does not deserve violence or overthrow, despite what the propaganda war against them may suggest.

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Kevin Barrett

Dr. Kevin Barrett, a Ph.D. Arabist-Islamologist, is one of America’s best-known critics of the War on Terror.

He is Host of TRUTH JIHAD RADIO; a hard driving weekly LIVE call in radio show. He also has appeared many times on Fox, CNN, PBS and other broadcast outlets, and has inspired feature stories and op-eds in the New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, the Chicago Tribune, and other leading publications.

Dr. Barrett has taught at colleges and universities in San Francisco, Paris, and Wisconsin, where he ran for Congress in 2008. He currently works as a nonprofit organizer, author, and talk radio host.

Comments Closed


  1. Since there’s no VT articles on this news that broke yesterday thought I’ld drop it on Kevin Barrett’s doorstep

    BREAKING! Former Pakistan President Musharraf Charged In The Assassination Of Benazir Bhutto



    • BTW when you look at the view count of this Fox News clip and related videos in the sidebar its very obvious that the news is being suppressed.

  2. When the people fear the government we have tyranny. When government fears the people, we have liberty. Immortal words from Thomas Jefferson.

    I think these words apply to all nations and all peoples.

    The trick is how to get all foreign influences out of Egypt and let the citizens of Egypt determine their own future.

    Too much money from foreigners. The US sends billions, the Saudis send billions, the EU sends more.

    With all this “aid” why do some Egyptians live in poverty? It is time to beat our swords into plowshares!

    • The “trick” is to not trust tricksters or believe what they say.

      “One can only hope that we turn the region into a caldron, and faster, please, That’s our mission in the war against terror. ”

      Michael Ledeen

  3. As has been pointed out, this is an article outlining the bias in media coverage within Egypt. This looks to be very true, and over the 12 Morsi months, increased in its overt attacks on the MB. However, the way that the MB tried to run things was much more outrageously self-interested and UK/US-serving than is merely hinted at in this article, such that the MB could be said to be more than deserving of such attacks. This is not to say that the whole episode was not staged; indeed, the attacks on the MB and the overt attempts to weaken their ability to govern would imply that the plan to bring them forward for the purpose of discrediting them once and for all goes much further back. It begs the question of who would gain by such a move, and then we might be getting somewhere. Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the basic premise and aims of the military are questionable, or that those of the MB were good. The kind of demonisation cited here is also typical of that which has recently been targeting the Egyptian military efforts in the international media. Interesting how that doesn’t come up on the radar of the writer of this article; basically, a misunderstanding of where the real enemies of humanity are to be found.

  4. ps: I love your radio show; I love your courage; I love your religion; I love your attempt to make a better world. But I’ve seen the paperwork on Morsi myself, and although the military is not an acceptable proxy, nor is his successor, I do not think Morsi is the hope and change guy anymore than Obama is. There is a true revolution brewing in Egypt, overcoming the fake one. We can only pray there will not be more bloodshed.

  5. Morsi is a CFR zionist stooge. It s as if the muslim in you is not being as skeptical as you woud otherwise be because you so want to believe it is a true muslim government opposed to the bad guys. I wish it were so as well, but I am afraid you are off here, Dr. Barrett.

  6. Professionalism? And just where exactly is there any professionalism in journalism since the rise of Rupert Murdoch, George Soros and their excremental colleagues? That’s why I read Veterans Today and for now on will only write for them. IF Stone, scrawny commie creep that he was, emphasized objectivity in journalism then proceeded to crucify Richard Nixon almost single handedly. No one is objective Mohammed, the best you can hope for is disinterested and then you are only likely to see the dog and pony show that pass’s for news in the west. Veterans today is doing perhaps the finest job on the internet covering Egypt. They are capitalizing on their own division in their editorial staff with Mr. Dean against the Muslim Brotherhood and Dr Barrett for it. That is how you get objectivity by playing passions off against each other in order to achieve balance. I can only speak for America but our “journalists” are bought and paid for. I would imagine yours are too. It works so well here. I have no dog in the fight in Egypt but I can tell you o0ne thing; if anyone is going to use violence to achieve their ends then that violence should be first and foremost used on the media.

    • Commie creep? Perhaps I am too young to truly understand the anti-communist propaganda that must have totally assimilated into most boomers, but thus is such a silly, ignorant term. I don’t care for Stone because he folded on JFK’s assassination, but I hardly think VT readers would use commie as a pejorative term since that crude way of beholding the world is what is destroying the world.

    • You don’t like “Commie creep?” How about Zio-commie creep? Stone’s movie “JFK” was financed by Arnon Milchan, an Israeli arms dealer linked to the smuggling of nuclear materiel into Israel to feed It’s nuclear weapons program at Dimona which JFK wanted to close down. And that is was a major factor in his assassination by Zionist hired hit men. The other factor was the Bobby Kennedy’s attempts to assassinate Castro with his “Operation Mongoose.” Castro is a communist that Stone supports because Castro also happens to be a Jew who has received aid from Israel. Israel’s nuclear weapons program was a joint program with the Red Chinese. The Vietnam War was all about getting the US into a position where its soldiers could be held hostage by Red China so the Pentagon would not attack its breeder reactors.

    • I.F. Stone published a famous “Weekly” political commentary in the 1960s. You are confusing him with Oliver Stone, Vietnam veteran and film director.

    • Sorry. I am a baby boomer and I never head of I. F. Stone. Thought that IF was a conjunction. Did not realize it was initials. Oliver Stone made moving called “Scarface” which portrayed the anti-Castro refugees as psychos. He made a movie about Nixon and he made JFK. Natural mistake.

    • Talk about “propaganda!” The commies practically invented the word. They used to say “truth is whatever furthers communism.” Stone never told you that Castro came to power with Batista’s help and that the Cubans who fought with him against Batista which he executed and imprisoned were liberal democrats who were opposed to dictatorship of any kind. They are the anti-Castro “right wing fanatics” which he helps the media smear.

    • We know that “Operation Mongoose” was RFK’s pet project from a Kennedy family member – Gore Vidal. A mongoose is an animal which kills venomous snakes and this was the view that Robert Kennedy had of Castro who betrayed his liberal democrat followers.

      This is what LBJ said about Stone’s friend Castro:

      “Kennedy was trying to get to Castro, but Castro got to him first”

  7. While I am certainly no fan of this coup, didn’t Morsi, just before he got taken out of power, call for all Egyptians to join the terrorists fighting against Assad? Doesn’t it as always come down to who is MORE freindy to the Israelis? If this is so, than which is the lesser of these two evils?

    PS Guy’s, please talk up the MILLION AMERICAN MARCH AGAINST FEAR.
    This march could be the catylist that just might wake up the amercan people.

  8. My word processor counted 4092 words in this article and the word “Israel” was not mentioned once. That is very interesting since the beginning of the end of Mubarak’s government seems to have coincided with the arrest of an Israeli spy network in Egypt apparently bent on carrying out another “Lavon Affair” type false flag in Egypt which seems to have involved “disrupting public order.”

    Wednesday, 22. December 2010

    “Egyptian security forces have arrested several people suspected of belonging to an Israeli spy network operating in Egypt. The alleged network reportedly consists of two fugitive Israeli officers and four Egyptian nationals…public prosecutors have charged them with conducting espionage for a foreign country … and forming a “terrorist cell” aimed at disrupting public order. Interpol, meanwhile, has been asked to issue arrest warrants for the Israeli suspects.”

    “Egypt arrests Israeli spies on tourist kidnapping suspect”

    Egyptian riots broke out the next month in January of 2011.

  9. They didn’t fail sami. The anti-islam people make propaganda to show world that they fail. They hypocrite at very best. Democracy ok if there choice comes to rule. But if someone comes against there satanic cause all the democracy , human rights and blah blah comes to end.

  10. The Muslim Brotherhood after more than 80 years of “closed” organization supported at one time or another by the US, Britain and some Gulf countries, were unable to transform their experience in organizing to governing and for sure were set up to fail. With all the intelligent people among their ranks they simply lacked the vision and experience on how to manage and administer a country, specially a country at best describe as a military police state and since the days of Sadat/Mubarak a country with an alliance between the deep state and the oligarchs. Morsi and the Brotherhoods failed to understand that the Deep State was not about to go and they fatally made the mistake of losing alliance with the young who made the revolution in the first place. They were incapable to transform their thinking and organization to the State of the Murshid following the Iranian model and they simply had no vision for the future state of Egypt, given its deep rooted military and police state, corrupt incompetent judicial system that sent them to jail in the thousands on flimsy political charges. They failed to understand the money in the streets that will stand in their ways. 60 years of anti-Brotherhood could not come to an immediate end simply because Morsi was elected president. They simply were set up to fail, with well funded and well organized strikes in key sectors that brought resentment and anger from average citizens.

    • The End

      … After after a long silence, Si Hamoud placed his hand on my arm and spoke: “There is a story told about the end of the world–how it would be. The vast numbers of the planet’s population were sunk in ignorance and violence and frenzy. In one of the great mega-cities, throbbing with directionless, explosive activity, two withered, ancient women, forgotten, dying beggars, crouched in a corner watching the endless, terrible spectacle. One of the women turned to the other and said, ‘It is awful. Look at them. Look at us all. I understand nothing. Why? Why this vast creation, this planet, these millions of people in misery? What is the meaning? Did anyone ever know’

      “After a long silence, the other woman placed her hand on her companion’s arm and said, ‘I remember, when I was a young girl, a long , long time ago, a strange man came to our city, begging. He was in rags like us and he wore a pointed cap. I can still remember the peace in his eyes as he put his hand on my arm and whispered to me , La ilaha il’Allah.’ “

      (Dallas, Ian. The Book of Strangers: A Novel, New York: State University of New York Press, 1972)

  11. The Process is called Exposing the hippos and it is best executed by Mother Nature.

    This event had to take place to unmask the pervs.

    One can only imagine the earthquakes that will shake that region once the MB rises from its ashes.

    God as always works in mysterious ways.

    • “I think the acid test of the battle that is going on between science and religion would be science’s ability to show that the entire world could tumble out of nothing. It’s already got back to within a photon’s throw of the origin of the universe as we’ve gone back into the big bang, and almost to the point of talking about what happened before the big bang. And I see no reason why we should not be able to go beyond the big bang and talk about its inception – how the universe emerged from absolutely nothing. ”

      Peter Atkins

    • What makes anyone think that the universe emerged from “absulutely nothing?” I think the universe (and there appears to be many of them) just always existed. Why not? If you can say that about the gods, then why not the universe? “Science is what we know, god is what we don’t know.” – Colonel Robert Ingersoll

      Even if there was a creator, how do you know she didn’t die in childbirth? And also the Bible god is just another pretend answer to origins. Too bad he was such a jerk though.

      Shepherds are for sheep,

    • The universe is by definition everything. How can there be more than one everything? There is as much evidence for “other universes” as there is for the existence of the gods of Olympus.

      The idea that the universe emerged from nothing comes from modern physics which tells us that a star which accumulates over a critical amount of mass will collapse into a “black hole.” All of the galaxies are traveling away from each other as if they had emerged from a fantastic explosion in the beginning of time. They call this the “big bang.”

      If there is enough “dark matter” in the universe then the physics tell us that the universe will eventually slow down and reverse direction into a “big crunch.” If there is a “big crunch” then the universe will return whence it came – into nothing – from which a new universe may emerge.

      Revelation|21:1 And I saw a new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven and the first earth were passed away; and there was no more sea.

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