…by Jonas E. Alexis
In the first article, I pointed out that Kevin MacDonald assumes in his trilogy that Darwinism is true. Here I will advance the argument that Darwinism is philosophically and metaphysically incoherent and therefore existentially unlivable primarily because it denies objective morality or ethics. As a corollary, I will argue that Darwinians who adopt a sort of morality as a basis for their worldview have to drop Darwin’s principles in order to do so.
We have to keep in mind that the prevailing worldview among Darwinians today is that morality or ethics is just an illusion. E. O. Wilson, commonly known as the father of sociobiology and the person who had a tremendously powerful influence on MacDonald, declared way back in 1985 that
“Ethics as we understand it is an illusion fobbed off on us by our genes to get us to co-operate. It is without external grounding. Ethics is produced by evolution but not justified by it, because, like Macbeth’s dagger, it serves as a powerful purpose without existing in substance.”
Right here both Wilson and his co-author Michael Ruse are engaged in philosophy, not science. In his breakthrough Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Wilson expounds on his “essence of sociobiology” this way: “Sociobiology is defined as the systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior.” The late historian of science and evolutionary biologist William Provine of Yale had this to say:
“Let me summarize my views on what modern evolutionary biology tells us loud and clear, and I must say that these are basically Darwin’s views…There is no ultimate foundation for ethics, no ultimate meaning in life, and no free will for humans, either.”
In a similar vein, Philosopher of science Alex Rosenberg of Duke University declares: “In a world where physics fixes all the facts, it’s hard to see how there could be room for moral facts. In a universe headed for its own heat death, there is no cosmic value to human life, your own or anyone else’s. “Real moral disputes can be ended in lots of ways: by voting, by decree, by fatigue of the disputants, by the force of example that changes social mores. But they can never really be resolved by finding the correct answers. There are none.”
Let us get to the fundamental implications of what Wilson and others are saying here. For them, morality is just a product of sociobiological evolution which has been ingrained in us and which has no serious objectivity. As Ruse himself puts it:
“Morality is a biological adaptation no less than are hands and feet and teeth . . . . Considered as a rationally justifiable set of claims about an objective something, ethics is illusory. I appreciate that when somebody says ‘Love they neighbor as thyself,’ they think they are referring above and beyond themselves . . . . Nevertheless such reference is truly without foundation. Morality is just an aid to survival and reproduction . . . and any deeper meaning is illusory . . .”
Decades later, Ruse, a staunch Darwinist (but not as grumpy as Richard Dawkins), propounded the same thing by saying that
“Morality is flimflam…It is something forged in the struggle for existence and reproduction, something fashioned by natural selection. It is as much a natural human adaptation as our ears or noses or teeth or penises or vaginas. It works and it has no meaning over and above this.
“Morality is just a matter of emotions, like liking ice cream and sex and hating toothache and marking student papers. But it is, and has to be, a funny kind of emotion. It has to pretend that it is not that at all! If we thought that morality was no more than liking or not liking spinach, then pretty quickly it would break down.”
Ruse is an intelligent man and a prolific scholar, but listen to him very carefully here:
“Does this mean that you can just go out and rape and pillage, behave like an ancient Roman grabbing Sabine women? Not at all. I said that there are no grounds for being good. It doesn’t follow that you should be bad.”
Wait a minute, Ruse. If morality is just “flimflam,” how do you adjudicate competing and bloody conflicts? How will you impose your moral worldview, which you say is essentially flimflam, upon the rest of us? And how will you argue with some psychologists and anthropologists who say that rape and even infanticide are evolutionary processes and that there are indeed “biological bases for sexual coercion”?
Well, Ruse and his fellow Darwinians cannot. In fact, Ruse and Wilson argue that statements like “Be kind to children” are actually “proper moral claims” and statements like “Treat cabbages with the respect you show your mother” are “crazy imperatives.” Positing statements like “Be kind to children are proper moral claims” is risible because the claim itself violates the very premise upon which Ruse and Wilson are intellectually navigating.
Moreover, if morality or even conscious will is an illusion, as psychologist Daniel Merton Wegner and others have argued, then moral responsibility is also an illusion. If moral responsibility is an illusion, then there is no such thing as good or evil act. If there is no such thing as good or evil, as Richard Dawkins himself argues in River Out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life , then Mao did nothing wrong when he slaughtered at least forty million precious lives in the twentieth century. Furthermore, the Israelis were just “dancing to their DNA” when they mercilessly slaughtered and expelled the Palestinians in 1948. If morality is just “a social construct,” as Laurence Tancredi has incoherently argues, then we are really in deep trouble.
Tancredi goes on to say that “the underlying foundation for morality appears more and more to be in our biology, hardwired in the brain.” MacDonald seems to believe almost the same thing when he told E. Michael Jones that “My moral sense…is intimately tied up with evolutionary thinking.”
MacDonald is invariably following Darwin here, who believed that morality was created, not discovered, by evolution. One can say that Darwin failed to establish a serious philosophy because he deliberately excluded practical reason from his project. In fact, he couldn’t’ even understand Immanuel Kant’s Metaphysics of Ethics. He admitted:
“It has interested me much to see how differently two men may look at the same points, though I fully feel how presumptuous it sounds to put myself even for a moment in the same bracket with Kant—the one man a great philosopher looking exclusively into his own mind, the other a degraded wretch looking from the outside thro’ apes & savages at the moral sense of mankind.”
According to historian of biology Peter J. Bowler, Darwin “was trying to turn morality into a branch of biology through the proposal that our instinctive behavior can only be understood as a product of natural processes that have adapted us to a particular way of life based on the family unit as a means of raising children.”
So, the logic is pretty clear here: it is either Kant’s categorical imperative, which provides a rigorous system for universal morality, or Darwin’s incoherent universe, which always turns around and bites its proponents. Embracing Darwin inevitably leads to blatant contradiction and intellectual suicide. Kant’s categorical imperative is intellectually satisfying because forbids contradictions; it is universal and it implicitly destroys the Darwinian ideology known as “survival of the fittest,” which is immoral.
Obviously MacDonald agrees that morality exists. But even then he is facing a formidable challenge because he does believe that morality is “tied up with evolutionary thinking.” Darwin himself would have challenged him on this very point. As he pointed out in second edition ofThe Descent of Man, if “men were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters, and no one would think of interfering.”
What Darwin was basically saying is that evolutionary principles dictate that morality is not really objective; if you simply rewind the film of evolution, then a different set of moral codes could have emerged. In fact, Darwin believed that “man’s mind had emerged from the worm’s in the first place. This was the crux.”
Darwin also believed that “The natural world has no moral validity or purpose.” Darwin was essentially paving the way for his intellectual children, who now find themselves in a torrent of contradictions. Will Durant argues that
“Darwin unconsciously completed the work of the Encyclopidists: they had removed the theological basis of modern morals, but they had left that morality itself untouched and inviolate, hanging miraculously in the air; a little breath of biology was all that was needed to clear away this remnant of imposture.”
Michael Ruse even complicates things when he argues elsewhere,
“With rationality goes morality. Indeed, it seems fair to say that without rationality, you cannot have morality…Note, then, that this all rather presupposes that humans have free will.
“A falling rock may do terrible things to those in its path, but we do not blame the rock. Once released, it had no choice about the path it was taking. However, if I am bashing you and not the rock, I am to blame. I did have a choice about whether to harm you.”
Exactly! This has been my entire point. If morality does not exist and if free will is an illusion, then it is irresponsible to blame people like Lloyd Blankfein for ruining much of the economy by cheating people.
This is a fundamental issues, and to this very day Darwinists have not been able to it. Their intellectual father, Darwin, could not either. Darwin himself was confronted with a similar dilemma shortly after the publication of the Origin of Species and the Descent of Man. A Manchester newspaper quickly realized that Darwin was logically advertising the idea that “might is right” and that “every cheating tradesman is also right.” Darwin disagreed with no serious justification. Yet one year before he died, Charles Darwin proved that his critics were right all along. He said,
“I could show fight on natural selection having done and doing more for the progress of civilization than you seem inclined to admit. Remember what risk the nations of Europe ran, not so many centuries ago, of being overwhelmed by the Turks, and how ridiculous such an idea now is!
“The more civilized so-called Caucasian races have beaten the Turkish hollow in the struggle for existence. Looking to the world at no very distant date, what an endless number of the lower races will have been eliminated by the higher civilized races throughout the world.”
So, it is survival of the fittest after all; it is the idea that wars and conflicts will get the “fittest” ahead. Sir Arthur Keith, anthropologist and Darwin’s biographer, was indeed a pacifist. But given that he was a Darwin sympathizer, he could not see anything wrong with wiping out the weak through wars, “for the real health of humanity and the building of stronger races.” Darwin himself said:
“Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows.”
If we follow this principle consistently, the Israeli regime has every right to slaughter the Palestinians. Of course, Darwinists will find this conclusion abhorrent, but that just shows that they themselves are being inconsistent.
Here is another classic example of what I am saying here. Scholar Bradley A. Thayer maintains that evolutionary theory “explains how warfare contributed to fitness in the course of the evolution of Homo sapiens.”
Thayer, of course, struggles mightily to rationally defend the thesis that “Warfare contributes to fitness” and that “people wage war to gain and defend resources” while maintaining that social Darwinists were wrong in taking social Darwinism to its logical conclusion. He says that “social Darwinists perverted Charles Darwin’s argument” and
“distorted evolutionary explanations because they misunderstood Darwin’s ideas and were ignorant of or consciously chose to ignore the naturalistic fallacy. Those who use evolutionary theory to explain aspects of human behavior must recall the social Darwinists’ errors. Doing so makes it possible not only to avoid repeating errors but also to advance scientific understanding.”
But Thayer moves on to make this argument:
“The ultimate causation for warfare is anchored in Darwinian natural selection and inclusive fitness….warfare can increase both the absolute and relative fitness of humans…From the classical Darwinian perspective, warfare contributes to fitness because individuals who wage war successfully are better able to survive and reproduce.”
Thayer repeats this thesis over and over throughout the book:
“An ultimate causal explanation for warfare based in evolutionary theory begins with the recognition that warfare contributes to fitness in certain circumstances because successful warfare lets the winner acquire resources.
“For evolutionary biology, a resource is any material substance that has the potential to increase the individual’s ability to survive or reproduce. As such it may be food, shelter, or territory, especially high-quality soil or wild foods; abundant firewood; or territory free of dangerous animals, such as lions, or insect infestations, or disease; and also status coalition allies, and members of the opposite sex.”
And then this: “Warfare might be necessary then for offensive purposes, to plunder resources from others. In these circumstances, an individual becomes fitter if he can successfully attack to take the resources of others.”
Thayer cites theoretician William Durham saying that
“War is one means by which individuals ‘may improve the material conditions of their lives and thereby increae their ability to survive and reproduce…Thus successful warfare would help the tribe gain resources, and for a swidden agricultural economy land is critically important.”
So, is Thayer really against social Darwinism? Ideologically, yes. But consistently and logically? No. If we take Darwin seriously, then Zionism and the Neoconservative movement are permissible they are essentially eliminating what the late rabbi Ovadiah Yosef called “donkeys.” If Jewish intellectuals like Bill Kristol are in the struggle for survival, then the Goyim must swiftly be eliminated. That is certainly consistent with Darwin’s grand scheme. If people cannot see this and try to avoid this vital contradiction, then you can be sure that they are not to be taken seriously or are not well equipped to understand their own position.
Furthermore, to appeal to reciprocal altruism to prove objective morality, a central protocol in Darwin’s grand scheme, is also a dead end because the life of Mother Theresa and countless other examples prove that this idea will not work.
MacDonald argues that “at least some wars would not have occurred if the war mongers had been good Darwinians.” Good Darwinians? What does that mean? Does that mean you are a good Darwinian if you follow Darwin’s ideas consistently? Or does that mean you are a good Darwinian if you reject his views on “survival of the fittest” and adopt a new method such as practical reason? MacDonald never fleshed this idea out, and we are simply inviting him to do so.
“From a Darwinian perspective,” writes MacDonald, the Civil War “was a disaster in which mass murder of cousins was rationalized by a moral ideal.” MacDonald again writes that no British Darwinian would have launched World War II.
This statement again is not consistent with the Darwinian thesis at all. He says that Winston Churchill and others did not “act like good Darwinians.” “If Churchill was a good Darwinian,” he says, “he would have been able to control these all too human impulses and think rationally about the long term good of his people.”
This is categorically false. Churchill himself thought that he was consistent with what Darwin was saying. Churchill himself “was profoundly impressed by Darwinism.” As I argued elsewhere, Churchill was indeed a thorough puppet of the Zionist regime, but adopting Darwin as an ideological construct didn’t help him.
Macdonald writes that “The demise of Darwinism has led to the death of the West.” Then we get to the real thing:
“As I noted elsewhere, Darwin did indeed have a dangerous idea. Evolutionary theory points to the deep structure of genocide as a particularly violent form of ethnic competition. But ethnic competition is ethnic competition whether its carried out in an orgy of violence, or by forcible removal of people from land on the West Bank by Jewish settlers or by forcible removal of Native Americans during the 19th century by white settlers, or by peaceful displacement of whites via current levels of immigration into Western societies. From a Darwinian perspective, the end result is no different. The genetic structure of the population has changed, and there are winners and losers. …
“And it could be argued that adopting an explicitly Darwinian perspective would actually lead to less genocide. For example, by understanding that ethnonational aspirations are a normal consequence of our evolutionary psychology, we could at least build societies that, unlike the Soviet Union, are not likely to commit genocide on their own people. Nor would we be saddled with a multicultural cauldron of competing and distrustful ethnic groups.”
I partly agree with the first paragraph. We would still have conflict without Darwin’s ideas, but that shouldn’t let Darwinians like MacDonald off the hook here. The essential tenets of Darwinism gives a license to conflict, so it is incoherent to use Darwinism to fight against conflict. I wish I could persuade the Darwinians to understand just that simple contradiction.
Moreover, MacDonald’s first paragraph seems to agree with the thesis that Darwinism cannot condemn genocide and ethnic cleansing morally, but then MacDonald moves on to say that “adopting an explicitly Darwinian perspective would actually lead to less genocide.” MacDonald can never justify this central thesis on Darwin’s writings himself. In fact, he has to skip the entire history of social Darwinism in order to make this historically irresponsible statement.
Darwin’s project was picked up by other British theoreticians like Francis Galton and Herbert Spencer. Spencer actually coined the term “survival of the fittest” in his book Principles of Biology. Spencer wrote: “This survival of the fittest which I have here sought to express in mechanical terms, is that which Mr. Darwin has called ‘natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life.” Like Darwin, Spencer believed that it was “unscientific” to preserve what he called “the weakly creatures.”
According to Spencer, “the fittest” ought to be brave enough to pursue a course of action which could be “at variance with customs that are perceived to be socially injurious.” According to science historian Rob Boddice of the Free University of Berlin,
“With such a vision, the preservation of the weak seemed to Spencer more clearly to be an immoral act because it adversely affected the welfare of the whole society. To be genuinely sympathetic—that is, to have fellow-feeling with other men—was to act in such a way as to reduce the aggregate of suffering, and not enhance it. To eliminate what Spencer could readily identify as the ‘weak’ of society—although Spencer was not sure how to do it—seemed like the moral thing to do.”
It is historically and intellectually dishonest to even remotely suggest that the social Darwinism of the 1920s and 30s did not logically flow from Darwin’s own ideological substratum. Galton made it clear that one of the goals of eugenics is to give “the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable.” He even declared in his Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development that “natural selection improves a race.”
And how should eugenics be applied to “improve a race”? “Whenever a low race is preserved under conditions of life that exact a high level of efficiency,” he said, “it must be subjected to rigorous selection. The few best specimens of that race can alone be allowed to become parents, and not many of their descendants can be allowed to live. The most merciful form of what I ventured to call ‘eugenics’ would consist in watching for the indications of superior strains or races, and in so favouring them that their progeny shall outnumber and gradually replace that of the old one.”
Galton was writing these things around 1869, and he did not have the political mechanism to bring these ideas to fruition. For him, it was incoherent to “preserve the sickly breeds for the sole purpose of tending them, as the breed of foxes is preserved solely for sport and its attendant advantages.” These new ideas, said Galton, must be “introduced into the national conscience, like a new religion.”
Galton even hoped that his ideas would establish “a sort of scientific priesthood,” where people would learn eugenic ideas and practically used them among humans. These ideas could only take form, said Galton, if theoreticians like himself could establish “a new religion, a religion which should not depend on revelation.”
This “master race” idea, according to Boddice, would require “social engineering.” And Galton was hastening to see that day. “When the desired fullness of information shall have been acquired then,” he said, “and not till then, will be the fit moment to proclaim ‘Jehad’ or Holy War against customs and prejudices that impair the physical and moral qualities of our race.”
In order to proclaim this “Holy War,” charity must be redefined and must be “distributed as to favour the best-adapted races.” Galton himself encouraged “charitably disposed persons” to essentially leave “substantial sums of money to the furtherance of Eugenic Study and practice,” as opposed to “wasting it on the alleviation of suffering.”
The question we should ask is this: Was Francis Galton a good Darwinian?
MacDonald writes in the Culture of Critique that “Scholars connected to evolutionary perspectives on human behavior or behavior genetics have commonly been branded genetic determinists in this highly politicized literature.”
This is not entirely false. As we have already seen, MacDonald must know that much of the Darwinian literature today denies concepts such as free will. MacDonald is obviously welcome to disagree with the literature on this issue, but that again means that MacDonald is not taking Darwin and his intellectual children seriously. Listen to Francis Crick, the co-discoverer of the structure of the DNA molecule:
“The Astonishing Hypothesis is that ‘You,’ your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.”
In a slightly different way, Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow declare: “Recent experiments in neuroscience support the view that it is our physical brain, following the known laws of science, that determines our actions and not some agency that exists outside those laws.” Then Hawking and Mlodinow take the next step, concluding that “free will is just an illusion.”
This idea suffers badly when it is taken to its inevitable conclusion. It implies that the brain determines our actions, and if that is so, then it logically follows that we are prisoners of our brains. Be it for good or evil, we have no choice but to follow the commands of our brains, since we are “no more than biological machines.”
The interesting thing is that this deterministic view is also embraced by Richard Dawkins, Steven Pinker and others. In actuality, they leave themselves no other choice. For example, Stephen Hawking is a flaming determinist, so it is no accident that in The Grand Design we constantly read phrases like “given the state of the universe at one time, a complete set of laws fully determines both the future and the past” (using Pierre Laplace’s argument) and this “scientific determinism must hold for people as well.” Not only that, the authors state that “biological processes are governed by the laws of physics and chemistry and therefore are as determined as the orbits of the planets.”
One needn’t be a logician to see that this is incoherent and therefore invalid. If the unfeeling laws of nature determine how a system will evolve over time, what reason do we as conscious human beings have to trust that system? The laws of nature do not have minds or emotions. And a thing by itself cannot be “determined”—i.e., passively acted upon—without necessitating an external determiner. As the noted scientist J.B.S. Haldane put it,
“If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms.”
Dennett himself unapologetically asserts that human beings “are made of mindless robots and nothing else, no non-physical, non-robotic ingredients at all.” Robots, by definition, do not have consciences and do not act as free agents. External entities always tell them what to do and they act on those orders. Again jumping off his premise that we are all robotic machines rather than free agents, Dennett argues that consciousness itself is an illusion.
Pinker states that the mind is simply “the physiological activity of the brain” and that this process goes back to the genes, which previously had been shaped by “evolutionary processes.” But even he understands that this is merely a hypothesis. He admits that “virtually nothing is known about the functioning microcircuitry of the human brain, because there is a shortage of volunteers willing to give up their brains to science before they are dead.”
If MacDonald disagrees with the mainstream literature on these issues we have described here, then he needs to flesh out his ideas in a manner that is consistent with his views on “good Darwinians.” He also needs to tell us whether people have free will and other things that cannot be described by the scientific method. I tried to raise similar issues with David Duke a while back, but I got virtually nothing but ad hominem attack, red herring, and straw man.
I honestly tried to anticipate what would be good objections to my arguments and how Duke might respond and then answer them in advance. I even stated quite clearly what Duke ought to do in order for his arguments to be sound. Moreover, I pointed out in numerous cases that Duke’s position is quite compatible with the Zionist ideology. For example, Duke made it quite explicit that:
“Just as two species of animals occupying a particular geographic area naturally develop a group evolutionary strategy to compete for resources, so human groups can do the same thing—even in the civilized societies.”
Aren’t Zionists and “Jewish supremacists” competing for resources in “the civilized societies”? Aren’t they “out-smarting” the Goyim with their Talmudic tricks? Doesn’t Charles Murray tell us that there is something called “Jewish Genius”? So, what’s the problem here? Why are people upset when Jews are using their wit to crush the Goyim?
Duke didn’t want to address these issues. What I also found was that I could not anticipate Duke’s irrational and absurd responses. At one point, he even said that I hold some of my positions because, well, “he is black, and that’s his way of affirming himself.”
Duke was advancing what is known as ad hominem in logic, and every freshman in philosophy or law knows that it is a rotten argument which must be avoided. Duke even thought that my objections to his views were personal attacks on him!
I was honestly shocked and completely disappointed. We are hoping that MacDonald will not resort to tactics like this and stick to the issue. MacDonald was also trained in philosophy, so hopefully he will not appeal to basic common fallacies in philosophy.
MacDonald laments that the academic world ostracizes him. He declares at the beginning of the Culture of Critique that the vast majority of scholars denounces his work, presumably because the issues are quite sensitive.
During an interview with Jim Fetzer, MacDonald says that the Culture of Critique, which I think is an important book, “got almost no reviews” in the academic world. He even admitted that he was being persecuted at California State University, Long Beach.
But then MacDonald always summons the academic world to attack things that he doesn’t like either. Not only that, he tends to demonize the intelligent design movement as if it is based on religious premises: “Of course, intelligent design is not a reasonable alternative at all, but a highly motivated effort to legitimize a religious world view in the sciences.”
I am not an intelligent design proponent and I don’t appreciate Ben Stein’s worldview any more than MacDonald does, but obviously MacDonald hasn’t been paying the slightest attention to what the movement has been saying. If he has, then has deliberately chosen to use a basic fallacy in logic again, and it is called the genetic fallacy.
This is very disappointing because MacDonald again doesn’t like it when Jewish intellectuals misrepresent or mischaracterize his position. He would have done a much better job to write a scholarly review of the movement and cite the sources contextually. But, like his critics, he took the easy route: demonization and cheap shots.
Moreover, isn’t it true that many serious academics are afraid to even criticize the theory of evolution? Was Dean Kenyon based his critique of the Darwinian paradigm on a “highly motivated effort to legitimize a religious world view” when he began to doubt the theory of evolution? Didn’t he previously write books such as Biochemical Predestination, arguing that life could have happened through natural selection and without an intelligent cause?
Was astronomer and mathematician Sir Fred Hoyle an intelligent design theorist when he produced numerous mathematical arguments against the theory of evolution? Is William Dembski really basing his The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance Through Small Probabilities on a “highly motivated effort to legitimize a religious world view”? Will MacDonald ever address this issue in a scholarly manner?
William Provine, a staunch Darwinian and critique of intelligent design, was intellectually honest enough to say both publicly and in academic circles that Darwinians like himself have to make sure that they do not demonize their opponents. To him, that would be the worst way to challenge their ideas.
Provine is also known for his opinion that students must wrestle with the ideas of origins and come to grips with them. When the book Darwin on Trial came out, Provine invited its author, Philip Johnson (a former professor of law at the University of California, Berkley), to debate him not only publicly but in some occasions even in his class! Now that is what I call a real educator—a man who has some intellectual backbone and who is not afraid to be challenged.
Will Kevin MacDonald be fair and honest here? “Any academic,” MacDonald says, wants “to see a well-reasoned critique of your work…” Pounding on his desk, MacDonald moves on to say: “What I’m looking for is all these people who absolutely reject me and say that I’m just a raving anti-Semite, I want you to go in there and refute this [his work].”
This is certainly a fair challenge to people like Steven Pinker. Again, will MacDonald and his colleague use the same standard when they criticize the intelligent design movement? When Thomas Nagel of New York University began to be skeptical about the central tenets of Neo-Darwinism and eventually published his doubts in Mind and Cosmos, Jerry Coyne of the University of Chicago instantly declared: “Nagel is a teleologist, and although not an explicit creationist, his views are pretty much anti-science and not worth highlighting.”
Coyne did not even challenge the arguments that Nagel put forth. He even likened Nagel’s conclusion to astrology! In the same vein, Daniel Dennett of Tufts University declared that Nagel is a member of a “retrograde gang” whose Mind and Cosmos “isn’t worth anything—it’s cute and it’s clever and it’s not worth a damn.”
Brian Leiter of the University of Chicago and Michael Weisberg of the Institute for Research in Cognitive Science were a bit fair to Nagel, but they ended up dismissing him in a slightly a similar tone. They fault Nagel for arguing that there is a kind of “reductive materialism” that is driving much of the scientific community. This certainly shows that Leiter and Weisberg have not been reading the literature carefully. But then a few sentences later, Leiter and Weisberg admitted that people like themselves “abandoned teleology and the supernatural as our primary tools for understanding and explaining the natural world”!
Leiter and Weisberg also dismiss the work of Alvin Plantinga because he has made “a career of dialectical ingenuity in support of the rationality of religious faith.” Plantinga’s scholarly studies are quite vast, but these people aren’t interested in stating his arguments contextually and challenging them logically.
If MacDonald cannot see this as a problem and refuses to address it logically, then evolutionary biologist Joan Roughgarden was right when he said that evolutionary biologists “are impervious to contrary evidence and alternative formulations.” Michael Ruse could also be right in saying that “Darwinism” has indeed become a “religion.”
 Kevin MacDonald, The Culture of Critique (Bloomington: 1st Books Library, 2002), 42.
 Michael Ruse and E. O. Wilson, “The Approach of Social Biology: The Evolution of Ethics,” James E. Huchingson, ed., Religion and the Natural Sciences: The Range of Engagement (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 1993), 310.
 Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975 and 2000), 4; emphasis added. For a refutation of some of these theories, see for example Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown, Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?: Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003).
 William Provine and Phillip E. Johnson, “Darwinism: Science or Naturalistic Philosophy? The Debate at Stanford University.” When Provine made that statement, the moderator asked him during the question-and-answer session: “How do you understand the divergence in your class towards creationism and evolutionism if there is no free will? Aren’t we all necessitated by your lecture?” The question was followed by what seemed to be a long applause from the audience. Provine’s interesting answer was: “The catch is making decisions does not guarantee the existence of free will.”
 Alex Rosenberg, The Atheist’s Guide to Reality: Enjoying Life Without Illusions (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012), 95, 96.
 Michael Ruse, The Darwinian Paradigm (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 262, 268-9.
 Michael Ruse, “Why Richard Dawkins’ humanists remind me of a religion,” Guardian, October 2, 2012; see also Science and Spirituality: Making Room for Faith in the Age of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
 Michael Ruse, “God is dead. Long live morality,” Guardian, March 15, 2010.
 Michael Ruse, Taking Darwin Seriously: A Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy (New York: Prometheus, 1998); The Philosophy of Human Evolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Darwinism and its Discontents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); The Darwinian Revolution: Science Red in Tooth and Claw (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979 and 1999); Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Monad to Man: The Concept of Progress in Evolutionary Biology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).
 Ruse, “God is dead. Long live morality,” Guardian, March 15, 2010
 Margo I. Wilson and Randy Thornhill, A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000); Glenn Hausfater and Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, eds., Infanticide: Comparative and Evolutionary Perspectives (New York: Aldine Publishing, 1984).
 Ruse and Wilson, “The Approach of Social Biology: The Evolution of Ethics,” 310.
 Daniel M. Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002); Chris Frith, Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007).
 Dawkins says: “In a universe of blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won’t find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, and no good, nothing but blind pitiless indifference…DNA neither knows nor cares. DNA just is. And we just dance to its music.” Richard Dawkins, River Out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 133.
 See Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962 (New York and London: Bloomsbury, 2010).
 Laurence Tancredi, Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals About Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 6-7.
 Ibid., 29.
 Lasha Darkmoon, “On the Moral Code: An Exchange among Lasha Darkmoon, E. Michael Jones, and Kevin MacDonald,” Occidental Observer, September 7, 2012.
 For further studies on this, see Peter J. Bowler and David Knight, Charles Darwin: The Man and His Influence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 183-184; Adrian Desmond and James Moore, Darwin: The Life of a Tormented Evolutionist (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), xvii.
 Quoted in Janet Browne, Charles Darwin: The Power of Place (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 297.
 Bowler and Knight, Charles Darwin, 183.
 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, 2d ed. (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1909), 100.
 Adrian Desmond and James Moore, Darwin: The Life of a Tormented Evolutionist (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 239.
 Quoted in Janet Browne, Charles Darwin: A Biography, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 54.
 Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1926 and 1961), 402.
 Michael Ruse, Atheism: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 79.
 See for example Greg Smith, “Why I Left Goldman Sachs,” NY Times, March 14, 2012.
 Quoted in Gertrude Himmelfarb, Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1962), 319.
 Ibid., 320.
 Darwin, Origin of Species, 459.
 Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 96.
 Ibid., 99, 100, 107, 114.
 Ibid., 99.
 Ibid., 102.
 Ibid., 103, 104.
 Ibid., 108.
 Ibid., 109.
 Ibid. 110, 111.
 See Denis L. Krebs, The Origins of Morality (New York: Oxford University, 2011), 41-42.
 Kevin MacDonald, “Pat Buchanan on Darwin,” Occidental Observer, July 1, 2009.
 For documentation on this, see Ralph Raico, Great Wars & Great Leaders (Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2010).
 MacDonald, “Pat Buchanan on Darwin,” Occidental Observer, July 1, 2009.
 For further study on this, see for example Richard A. Soloway, Demography and Degeneration: Eugenics and the Decline of Birthrate in Twentieth-Century Britain (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Robert C. Bannister, Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American Social Thought (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979); Peter Watson, The Modern Mind: An Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper Perennial, 2002); Paul A. Lombardo, ed., A Century of Eugenics in America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011); Nancy Ordover, American Eugenics: Race, Queer Anatomy, and the Science of Nationalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003); Ian Robert Dowbiggin, Keeping America Sane: Psychiatry and Eugenics in the United States and Canada, 1880-1940 (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997); Edward J. Larson, Sex, Race, and Science: Eugenics in the Deep South (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Robert Whitaker, Mad in America: Bad Science, Bad Medicine, and the Enduring Mistreatment of the Mentally Ill (New York: Perseus Publishing, 2002); Daniel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985).
 Quoted in Diane B. Paul, “The Selection of the ‘Survival of the Fittest,’” Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 413-414.
 See Rob Boddice, The Science of Sympathy: Morality, Evolution, and Victorian Civilization (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2016), chapter 6, kindle edition.
 Francis Galton, Inquiries into the Faculty and Its Development (New York: Dutton, 1919), 198.
 Ibid., 199-200.
 Quoted in Boddice, The Science of Sympathy, chapter 6.
 Quoted in ibid., chapter 6.
 Quoted in ibid., chapter 6.
 Quoted in ibid., chapter 6.
 Quoted in ibid., chapter 6.
 Quoted in ibid., chapter 6.
 MacDonald, Culture of Critique, 42.
 Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 3.
 Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design (New York: Bantam Books, 2010), 32.
 Ibid., 26, 30.
 Ibid., 32.
 Quoted in E. Michael Jones, “The Rise and Fall of the New Atheism,” Culture Wars, October 2017.
 Daniel C. Dennett, Freedom Evolves (New York: Penguin, 2003), 2-3.
 Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (New York: Basic Books, 1991).
 Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 184.
 This is actually the point that E. Michael Jones raised to MacDonald back in 2012, and MacDonald didn’t seem to have a solid answer.
 Charles Murray, “Jewish Genius,” Commentary, April 1, 2007.
 Listen to his radio show which was aired on February 18, 2016.
 Kevin MacDonald, “Ben Stein’s Expelled: Was Darwinism a Necessary Condition for the Holocaust?,” Occidental Observer, December 1, 2008.
 William A. Dembski, The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance through Small Probabilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
 For those who would like to pursue this study further, see for example William A. Dembski and Michael Ruse, Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); John Angus Campbell and Stephen C. Meyer, eds., Darwinism, Design and Public Education (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003); Peter J. Bowler, Monkey Trials and Gorilla Sermons: Evolution and Christianity from Darwin to Intelligent Design (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).
 Jim Fetzer has attempted to do that in Render Unto Darwin, but in my view he fails. Fetzer and I were planning to have a written debate on this in 2015, but for various reasons the debate never happened. But viewers can see some of our interactions in the comment section here: http://jamesfetzer.blogspot.kr/2015_09_08_archive.html.
 Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
 Michael Chorost, “Where Thomas Nagel Went Wrong,” Chronicle of Higher Education, May 13, 2013.
 Brian Leiter and Michael Weisberg, “Do You Only Have a Brain? On Thomas Nagel,” The Nation, October 3, 2012.
 Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God (New York: Cornell University Press, 1967 and 1990); Warrant: The Current Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 200); Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
 Chorost, “Where Thomas Nagel Went Wrong,” Chronicle of Higher Education, May 13, 2013.
 Michael Ruse, Darwinism as Religion: What Literature Tells Us about Evolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).