…by Jonas E. Alexis, Arimasa Kubo, and Eiji Yamashita
Seoul, the capital of South Korea, is just about two hours from Tokyo, the current capital of Japan. It was cold when I traveled to Tokyo about two weeks ago, but not as cold as it was in Korea. I don’t like cold weather; I prefer fall or spring in South Korea but not winter. After all, I’m from Florida, a state whose lowest temperature ever recorded is minus 2 degrees Fahrenheit (about minus 18.9 Celcius).
But the trip to Tokyo was nice and productive. I stayed in a pod hotel, and this was my first time. Pod hotels remind me of hyperbaric chambers. Each pod has a Panasonic-built sleeping system that smoothly puts you to sleep and generally wakes you up at a particular time by altering the light.
I thought the pods were little Hobbit-influenced chambers which provide some kind of mental peace and quiet. They also remind me of what Bilbo Baggins told Gandalf in J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Hobbit. “We are plain and quiet folk and have no use for adventures. Nasty disturbing uncomfortable things!” Bilbo was too comfortable in the Shire, and going to an adventure for him was, as he put it, a nasty thing.
In any event, I went to Tokyo precisely because I wanted to have what E. Michael Jones would call “unprotected intercourse” with historians, scholars and writers who have written about the Japanese annexation of Korea and other historical topics such as World War II. I have been in communication with my friend Arimasa Kubo since last July, and I told him last November that I would be in Japan at the end of December in order to discuss some of the fundamental issues that undergird the Japanese-Korean relation. Kubo confirmed that Eiji Yamashita, emeritus professor at Osaka City University, would also be joining us. Prof. Yamashita and I corresponded in the past, and I was delighted when I was told that he would hop in.
We met for lunch on the 30th of December, and we spent three hours discussing numerous issues. I had previously read numerous scholarly studies and archival documents on what Prof. Yamashita calls the Japanese anschluss, and I will be producing those materials in the next three months.
Let me mention in passing that Dae-Sook Suh’s archival study, Documents of Korean Communism, 1918-1948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), is a seminal work on the Communist plan for subversion in Korea. Atul Kohli’s State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) has an entire chapter on the Korean economy, infrastructure, and education system during the Japanese annexation, and the issues are very complex. Moreover, archival documents from the US military, the Dutch military, the Japanese military, and even the Korean military are now readily available. But we cannot discuss them here. But rest assured that those documents will be published within three months.
Kohli, who is the David K.E. Bruce Professor of International Affairs at Princeton, is essentially saying almost the same thing that Kubo and Yamashita were arguing. But throughout our dialogue in Tokyo, I tried to play the devil’s advocates and challenge Kubo and Yamashita on a number of issues to see how they would respond. “I talked to many Koreans about the Japanese annexation of Korea, and some of them are not persuaded by the Japanese narrative,” I started. “What would you say to them?”
“I think if they love the truth,” Kubo responded, “then we would have an honest dialogue. We would start with facts that we both agree on, and we would gradually work out way toward a final conclusion.” That was indeed a stunning statement. Truth, as Plato puts it in the Republic, is that which corresponds to reality. Truth will inexorably produce facts, and facts, as John Adams observed, “are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passion, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.”
Kubo is absolutely right about beginning a conversation with your opponent with facts and serious evidence. Unfortunately, many historians today do not believe in truth and facts at all. As historian and sociologist Rodney Stark eloquently puts it, many historians “argue that since absolute truth must always elude the historian’s grasp, ‘evidence’ is inevitably nothing but a biased selection of suspect ‘facts.’ Worse yet, rather than dismissing the entire historical undertaking as impossible, these same people use their disdain for evidence as a license to propose all manner of politicized historical fantasies or appealing fictions on the grounds that these are just as ‘true’ as any other account.”
British historiographer and postmodernist Keith Jenkins declares, “We might as well forget history and live in the ample imaginaries provided by postmodern type theories.” Jenkens proves to be driven by ideology rather than rational inquiry, for he knows that this opens the floodgates for irrationalism.
Historian Keith Windschuttle of the University of New South Wales noticed that the cultural trends of the 1960s energized relativism among some historians and intellectuals. Martha C. Howell of Columbia University and Walter Prevenier of the University of Ghent (Belgium) trace these cultural trends even further back, arguing that relativism gradually began to take form after World War II. The historians and intellectuals who were drawn to cultural relativism were not interested in finding the truth—since they didn’t believe ultimate truth exists—but were largely motivated by Marxist ideologies to pursue their own self-interests.
We are now faced with a metaphysical issue here. If historical events cannot be verified, as some people have incoherently argued, then it really does not matter whether Rome destroyed the Jewish temple in A.D. 70 or not. Everything boils down to opinion versus opinion—a sort of survival of the fittest of ideas. The strongest opinion wins, regardless of whether it is true or false.
This is not to say that historical descriptions are as black and white—one must be willing to accept that there are historical issues that are debatable. The real issue is whether history itself is a legitimate investigation of what happens and whether history can help us understand who we are from an objective point of view. As we are arguing, one of the reasons why people gravitate toward a deconstructive view of history is for ideological purposes, not for truth.
Take French intellectual Michel Foucault. As a postmodernist, Foucault set out to deconstruct the idea of universal truth—transcendent truth and reality that goes far beyond culture, race, and creed. In the process, he ended up with his own worldview, declaring, “Power produces knowledge…There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.”
Before Foucault, French philosopher Jean Francois Lyotard argued that there is a “war on totality,” a concept which to him meant that any claim that purports to be universally true should be rejected. This war, for Lyotard, was against “meta-narratives,” theories that purport to show that there must be a coherent, consistent, historically logical and objective way of seeing the world. Lyotard drew heavily on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein (a close friend of Bertrand Russell), who made a similar argument.
So it is safe to say that the postmodern view of history is intellectually and philosophically weighed and found wanting. In other words, if the postmodern view of history is correct, then Japanese, Korean, and Western historians and intellectuals are really wasting their time trying to figure what really happened on the Korean peninsula from 1910 until 1945. To be quite blunt, if the postmodern interpretation is accurate, then the Korean government shouldn’t be angry at the Japanese precisely because the Koran narrative is just one interpretation which the Korean government is desperately trying to impose on the Japanese government.
By the middle of our discussion, we shifted to Franklin Roosevelt, and both Prof. Yamashita and Kubo seemed to have been a little surprised when I told them that Roosevelt knew that Japan was going to attack America and that US officials were deliberately and maliciously provoking Japan. Yamashita and Arimasa knew that this was clearly the case, but they didn’t seem to expect an American to say it.
“Roosevelt needed an excuse to go to war,” I said, “and he couldn’t find one. Pearl Harbor was what we now call a false flag—a covert operation that is designed and engineered by the war machine and political elites particularly in Washington and elsewhere to deceive and manipulate the masses and public opinion.”
“Do most Americans believe what you believe?” Yamashita asked. At that moment, I burst out laughing. “No,” I said, “but most Americans never liked perpetual wars. As I said before, Roosevelt himself had to use deceptive means in order to send American troops to World War II. It is the same thing with perpetual wars today. Most Americans never wanted the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, and Syria. George W. Bush also had to use deliberate lies and complete fabrications in order to get America into bloody wars in the Middle East.”
Scholars now agree that the war machine and covert entities like the CIA and the Pentagon use manipulation and “psychological warfare” to seduce the masses. And Roosevelt was unquestionably involved in it, particularly before World War II. As the noted historian Thomas Fleming rightly put it, Roosevelt “had seduced America into the war with clever tricks, one-step-forward one-step-back double-talk, and the last resort provocation of Japan. Deceit had been at the heart of the process.”
Isolationism—the position that America’s interest is best served by keeping the affairs of other nations at a distance—was still vibrant in the 1930s. This political idea kept America out of trouble for decades, and it was established by the founding fathers themselves. Thomas Jefferson declared: “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.”
George Washington, along with James Monroe and others, took similar positions. Washington declared: “My ardent desire is to keep the United States free from political connections with every other country, to see them independent of all and under the influence of none.” James Madison said way back in 1809: “Indulging no passions which trespass on the rights or the repose of other nations, it has been the true glory of the United States to cultivate peace by observing justice, and to entitle themselves to the respect of the nations at war by fulfilling their neutral obligations with the most scrupulous impartiality.”
John Quincy Adams concurred in 1821: “America well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extraction, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom. The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force. She would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit… She does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.”
Charles Pinckney, Constitutional Convention, declared in 1787: “We mistake the object of our government, if we hope or wish that it is to make us respectable abroad. Conquest or superiority among other powers is not or ought not ever to be the object of republican systems.” James Madison even contented that:
“Of all the enemies to public liberty war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes; and armies, and debts, and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few.
“In war, too, the discretionary power of the Executive is extended; its influence in dealing out offices, honors, and emoluments is multiplied; and all the means of seducing the minds, are added to those of subduing the force, of the people.
“The same malignant aspect in republicanism may be traced in the inequality of fortunes, and the opportunities of fraud, growing out of a state of war, and in the degeneracy of manners and of morals engendered by both. No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.”
In short, perpetual wars and unconditionally supporting a foreign entity was completely foreign to the founding fathers of America. The Neoconservatives and the entire war machine completely changed that. As Jewish legal scholar Stephen M. Feldman himself says, the Neoconservatives led “an assault on the hegemonic pluralist democratic regime that had taken hold of the nation in the 1930s.”
Right before our three-hour conversation ended, Prof. Yamashita took some papers out of his bag and gave me copies of some articles he has published in Japan Times, “Japan’s largest and oldest English-language daily newspaper,” and Perspective on History, “the newsmagazine of the American Historical Association.” In these papers, Yamashita challenges McGraw-Hill publisher, and Alexis Dudden, a professor at the University of Connecticut and the author of Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power. His challenge his challenge to both McGraw-Hill and Dudden are worth reading.
To the editor:
Generally speaking, it is better that governments do not intervene in the writing of history textbooks. However, if clear factual mistakes are found in textbooks, and if those mistakes have extremely negative effects on the dignity of a given country and its nationals, then it is natural that such a country’s government request revisions of the errors.
We think McGraw-Hill’s textbook is just such a case. In their March 17, 2015, booklet “Requesting Corrections of Factual Errors in McGraw-Hill Textbook,” 19 Japanese historians identified 8 apparent factual errors within 26 lines in merely 2 paragraphs concerning the issue of comfort women, and then requested that the textbook’s publisher, McGraw-Hill, correct these errors. If the US government was in the same situation, it presumably would have taken issue with the publisher and author of such an error-laden textbook, in an incomparably fiercer manner.
The title of the statement of the 20 American historians (Perspectives, March 2015) is “Standing with Historians of Japan.” However, even Professor Yoshiaki Yoshimi, whom the 20 American historians hold in high regard in their statement, could identify multiple factual errors in the McGraw-Hill textbook, if he were asked to do so. We are afraid that, in point of fact, the 20 American historians would never be able to find a single Japanese academician with whom they could stand. It would be as if they were standing with Japanese ghosts.
Both the author of the McGraw-Hill textbook and the authors and co-signers of the 20 American historians’ statement never mentioned the Interagency Working Group (IWG) report of April 2007, which stated that they could not find any documentation to show that the Japanese government committed war crimes with respect to the comfort women during the Second World War. This report was the result of very thorough research by the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
NARA identified 142,000 pages of Japanese-related classified documents held by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), CIA, FBI, US Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC), and others. This research task took 7 years and cost $30 million. If the author of the McGraw-Hill textbook and the 20 American historians did not know about the IWG report, then they should be censured for performing an inadequate study; if they did know about the IWG report but ignored it, then their impartiality as academics should be seriously questioned.
In the McGraw-Hill textbook, there are phrases such as “the army presented the women to the troops as a gift from the Emperor” and “At the end of the war, soldiers massacred large numbers of comfort women to cover up the operation.” These accounts are completely without supporting historical evidence. Writers of fiction have license to create alternative realities using their imaginations, but history textbooks written by serious scholars should contain nothing but demonstrable truths.
Furthermore, we have to say that the credibility of the McGraw-Hill textbook as a whole should be seriously questioned as 8 errors of fact in only 26 lines, mentioned earlier, on the comfort women were found in the textbook. Given how many mistakes were in just these two paragraphs, one would seriously wonder about the quality of the other parts of the textbook. This is a problem that affects the prestige of American historians as a whole.
American historians need to make an effort to check the appropriateness of American history textbooks in America, across the board, rather than point fingers at the Japanese government when it tries to call attention to these errors of fact. The efforts of American historians will determine whether or not future generations of Americans will have the correct historical view, which will be extremely important for the United States as well as for the rest of the world.
Takehiko Aoyagi, International University of Japan
Kazuhiro Araki, Takushoku University
Koji Okamoto, Osaka International University
Genki Fujii, Takushoku University
Nobukatsu Fujioka, Takushoku University
Shigeki Hakamada, Niigata Prefectural University
Michiko Hasegawa, Saitama University*
Katsuo Hiizumi, Aichi University
Yoichi Hirama, National Defense Academy of Japan
Kobo Inamura, Chuo University
Nozomu Ishii, Nagasaki Junshin Catholic University
Takashi Ito, University of Tokyo*
Hideo Kaneoka, Akita International University
Kanji Katsuoka, Meisei University
Minoru Kitamura, Ritsumeikan University*
Kei-ichiro Kobori, University of Tokyo
Tetsuo Kubota, Takushoku University
Jun Kuno, Osaka International University
Mutsuo Mabuchi, National Defense Academy of Japan
Mitsunobu Matsuura, Kogakkan University
Koichi Mera, University of Southern California
Fumio Niwa, Takushoku University
Akira Momochi, Nippon University
Tetsuji Murase, Kyoto University
Terumasa Nakanishi, Kyoto University
Kazume Nishidate, Iwate University
Kanji Nishio, University of Electro-Communications*
Tsutomu Nishioka, Tokyo Christian University
Yasuo Oh-Hara, Kokugakuin University
Central Washington University
Nobuhiko Sakai, University Of Tokyo
Hei Seki, Takushoku University
Haruo Shimada, Chiba University of Commerce
Yoichi Shimada, Fukui Prefectural University
Shuhei Shiozawa, Keio Gijuku University
Toyojiro Soejima, Kinki University
Seishiroh Sugihara, Josai University
Shiroh Takahashi, Meisei University
Masayuki Takayama, Teikyo University
Tadae Takubo, Kyorin University*
Hidemichi Tanaka, Tohoku University*
Tetsuji Tanaka, Tashkent State Economic University in Uzbekistan
Taikin Tei, Tokyo Metropolitan University
Koh-Ichiro Tomioka, Kanto Gakuin University
Masato Ushio, Takushoku University
Shoh-Ichi Watanabe, Sophia University*
Toshio Watanabe, Takushoku University*
Hidetsugu Yagi, Reitaku University
Eiji Yamashita, Osaka City University*
Tsuneo Yoshihara, Takushoku University
*9 initiators of the 50 Japanese academics’ rebuttal
Challenging the ’20 American historians’
I organized “the 50 Japanese academics’ rebuttal of the 20 American historians’ statement,” which was announced last September and published in the December issue of Perspectives on History of the American Historical Association (AHA). This is the same periodical that published the 20 American historians’ statement last March. Our rebuttal was reported on in the Dec. 10 edition of The Japan Times and the December issue of Inside Higher Ed, an e-magazine on education based in Washington. I would like to take this opportunity to clarify the main aim of our rebuttal.
We said the 20 American historians would never find a single Japanese academician with whom they could stand, even though the title of their statement was “Standing with historians of Japan,” because there are at least eight factual mistakes in 26 lines about “comfort women” in the McGraw-Hill textbook at issue. Furthermore, we questioned their fairness since their statement had no reference to the report by the Interagency Working Group in the United States in 2007.
However, a more important reason for why we wrote the rebuttal is that we were concerned about the 20 American historians’ basic stance as scholars and educators, beyond the immediate comfort women issue. We were confident that our arguments could lead to better education for American youths, and hence were inherently beneficial to the U.S. as well as to the rest of the world in the longer perspective.
I think our concern was right. Several scholars, such as professor Alexis Dudden (University of Connecticut), professor Andrew Gordon (Harvard University) and others out of the 20 American historians were interviewed by The Japan Times or Inside Higher Ed, but none of them seemed to be worried about the education of young Americans. Moreover, it seems to me that American historians are still refusing to address the major factual errors in the McGraw-Hill history textbook.
Many English-language media outlets, including The Japan Times, refer to the comfort women as “sex slaves.” But such terminology is factually incorrect and runs counter to the Japanese government’s position. I hereby introduce the latest two examples. On Jan. 18, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe replied to a question raised by Upper House member Kyoko Nakayama in the Upper House Budget Committee that the phrases “sex slaves” and “200,000 comfort women” run counter to the facts.
Moreover, on Feb. 16 Deputy Foreign Minister Shinsuke Sugiyama replied to a question raised by the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in Geneva that there was no evidence proving the forcible removal of comfort women from their homes by the Japanese military and government authorities.
There is a widespread misunderstanding among the Western world that the Abe administration is somehow suppressing the media. It seems to us that the situation is precisely the opposite. In fact, the reach of the Abe administration’s efforts is rather limited by both the domestic and foreign media. Japan is among the highest ranked countries in the world in terms of freedom of speech. On the contrary, freedom of speech in the U.S. is obviously lower than that of Western European countries or Japan, because there are so many social taboos there.
To take just one prominent example out of many, the U.S. government actively oppresses denunciations by former governmental staff members. Given all this, it would seem that Americans are not in a position to lecture other mature democracies on the finer points of freedom of speech. Instead, the 20 American historians should be more concerned about the free speech situation within their own country.
Upon its commencement in October 1998, the research objective of the IWG Report was limited to Nazi war crimes. Thereafter, though, Japanese Imperial government records were added to the objectives of the IWG Report in December 2000 in response to a request from the Global Alliance for Preserving the History of World War II in Asia, a group led by people of Chinese descent based in San Francisco. After very extensive research lasting seven years, the IWG could not find any documentation to show that the Japanese government committed war crimes with respect to the comfort women.
In the IWG Final Report to the U.S. Congress, a document stretching 155 pages, there is no language clearly indicating that any record of Japanese war crimes vis-a-vis comfort women had been uncovered. Instead, the report contains reams of unimportant passages, presumably with the aim of camouflaging an inconvenient truth.
But despite no evidence of war crimes by the Japanese government in the IWG Report to the U.S. Congress, on July 30, 2007, the U.S. Congress still passed House Resolution 121 on the comfort women, demanding that the Japanese government apologize for “crimes” for which no evidence had been produced. The whole process in the U.S. Congress at that time was extremely unfair — or worse — to Japan.
Today, American fairness is in serious question almost everywhere in the world, although most Americans may not know this or do not wish to know. This broad lack of trust in American fairness is one of the major factors in the failure of American foreign policy on so many fronts in the past decades.
Under such circumstances, is it wise for the U.S. to show apparent unfairness to the Japanese public, too, especially given that Japan is one of the closest American allies in the world? If the U.S. wishes to see its foreign policy succeed, it should begin with a reassessment of its fundamental fairness. The safety of Americans and of the rest of the world depends on it.
It is often said that we cannot acquire a clear picture of any given era of history until at least a century has elapsed. Since we are now 71 years past the end of World War II, it is natural that new evidence or interpretations will emerge in the years to come. Not only newly found historical facts but also new historical interpretations should be respected and subjected to academic discussion and debate. Incidentally, this year marks the 102nd anniversary of the outbreak of World War I, but we still lack a coherent historical evaluation of even that conflict.
And yet, these same Americans who have striven to fashion a consensus regardless of where the evidence leads them are quick to call us revisionists. But isn’t it always important for open-minded scholars to seek revisions when they are appropriate? Those who cry “revisionism” are unscientific; they do not behave like intellectuals. Perhaps it is time for us to return the favor and label them the “bigoted old guard.”
On this note, it is also important for us to begin to discuss the meaning of the latest world war, the Cold War, particularly in connection with World War II. It is indispensable to correctly recognize why the Cold War began soon after the end of World War II in order to clarify the characteristics of the “hot war.” It is also very important to review how we in the free world won the Cold War.
Finally, to return to our original point, McGraw-Hill Education in New York should sincerely address the major factual defects in its history textbook for the future generation of the U.S. and the rest of the world as well.
-  J. R. R. Tolkien, The Hobbit (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), 7.
-  Plato, The Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 116.
-  Quoted in David McCullough, John Adams (New York: Touchtone, 2001), 68.
-  Rodney Stark, Cities of God: The Real Story of How Christianity Became an Urban Movement and Conquered Rome (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 7.
-  Quoted in C. Behan McCullagh, The Logic of History: Putting Postmodernism in Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2004), 8.
-  Keith Windschuttle, The Killing of History: How Literary Critics and Social Theorists Are Murdering Our Past (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 1996), xiii-xiv.
-  See Martha C. Howell and Walter Prevenier, From Reliable Sources: An Introduction to Historical Methods (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001).
-  Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 27.
-  Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 82.
-  See Brian McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life—Young Ludwig, 1889-1921 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
-  For studies on this, see John Koster, Operation Snow: How a Soviet Mole in FDR’s White House Triggered Pearl Harbor (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2012); Robert Stinnett, Day Of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor (New York: Touchtone, 2000); Koichi Mera, Whose Back was Stabbed?: FDR’s Secret War on Japan (Lanham: Hamilton Books, 2017).
-  For scholarly studies on related issues, see John J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Michael MacDonald, Overreach: Delusions of Regime Change in Iraq (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014); Murray Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Muhammad Idrees Ahmad, The Road to Iraq: The Making of a Neoconservative War (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2014); Stephen M. Feldman, Neoconservative Politics and the Supreme Court: Law, Power, and Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 2013).
-  See Christopher Simpson, Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
-  Thomas Fleming, New Dealers’ War: FDR and the War Within World War II (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 257.
-  The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Volume 33: 17 February to 30 April 1801 (Princeton University Press, 2006), 148-52.
-  Derek Bickerton, “The Founding Fathers on the Mubarak Crisis,” Psychology Today, February 3, 2011.
-  Stephen M. Feldman, Neoconservative Politics and the Supreme Court: Law, Power, and Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 1.
-  Alexis Dudden, Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006).