The President‘s determination to get into war to gratify his vanity of having a third term of office is touched on by Jesse H. Jones, former Secretary of Commerce and head of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, in his book, Fifty Billion Dollars (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1951). In this comprehensive and carefully documented volume, which is obligatory background reading on U.S. politics in the years 1932-1945, Mr. Jones, throws much light on Roosevelt, the Total Politician. On Roosevelt‘s desire for getting into World War II, these (p. 260) are Mr. Jones‘s words: Regardless of his oft repeated statement I hate war,‘ he was eager to get into the fighting since that would insure a third term.
The most notorious instance of the President‘s Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde character was his unblushing promise, as he prepared for intervention, that there would be no war. The third-term candidate‘s again and again and again and again speech (Boston, October 30, 1940) is invariably quoted, but even more inclusive was his broadcast statement of October 26 that no person in a responsible position in his government had ever suggested in any shape, manner, or form the remotest possibility of sending the boys of American mothers to fight on the battlefields of Europe. We are thus confronted by a dilemma. Was Roosevelt the scheming ruiner of his country or was he a helpless puppet pulled by strings from hands which wielded him beyond any power of his to resist?
A continuing lack of any policy beyond the corralling of minority votes blighted the entire world effort of our devoted and self-sacrificing soldiers, and frustrated the hopes of those of our lower echelon policymakers who were trying to salvage something useful to civilization from our costly world-wide war.
Our diplomatic personnel, military attaches, and other representatives abroad were confused by what they took to be rudderless drifting. In one foreign country diametrically opposed statements were issued simultaneously by heads of different U.S. missions. In Washington, the Office of War information issued under the same date line completely conflicting instructions to two sets of its representatives in another Asiatic country. A United States military attache with the high rank of brigadier general made an impassioned plea (in the author‘s hearing) for a statement of our purposes in the war; But, asking the bread of positive strategic policy, he got the stone of continued confusion. Some of the confusion was due to the fact that of-
ficials from the three principal kinds of Democrats (Chapter III) were actuated by and gave voice to different purposes; most of it, however, resulted from the actual lack of any genuine policy except to commit our troops and write off casualties with the smoke of the President‘s rhetoric.
Yes, we were fighting a war, not to protect our type of civilization or to repel an actual or threatened invasion, but for Communist and antiGerman votes. Thus when our ailing President went to Yalta, he is said to have carried no American demands, to have presented no positive plans to counter the proposals of Stalin. In his feebleness, with Alger Hiss nearby, he yielded with scarcely a qualm to the strong and determined Communist leader. For fuller details see the carefully documented article, America Betrayed at Yalta, by Hon. Lawrence H. Smith, U.S. Representative from Wisconsin (National Republic, July, 1951).
(2) The powerful Eastern European element dominant in the inner circles of the Democratic Party regarded with complete equanimity, perhaps even with enthusiasm, the killing of as many as possible of the world-ruling and Khazar-hated race of Aryans (Chapter II); that is, native stock Americans of English, Irish, Scotch, Welsh, German, Dutch, Scandinavian, Latin, and Slavic descent. This non-Aryan power bloc therefore indorsed Unconditional Surrender and produced the Morgenthau Plan (see below), both of which were certain to stiffen and prolong the German resistance at the cost of many more American lives, much more desolation in Germany, and many more German lives also Aryan, The plans of the prolongers of the war were sustained by those high Democratic politicians who saw nothing wrong in the spilling of blood in the interest of votes.
Unfortunately, President Roosevelt became obsessed with the idea of killing Germans (As He Saw It, pp. 185-186) rather than defeating Hitler, and reportedly set himself against any support of anti Hitler elements in Germany. Perhaps taking his cue from his Commander-in-Chief—a term Roosevelt loved—General Mark Clark told American soldiers of the Fifth Army that German ―assaults were welcome since it gives you additional opportunity to kill your hated enemy in large numbers. The general drove the point home. It is open season on the Anzio bridgehead, he continued, and there is no limit to the number of Germans you can kill (New York Times, February 13, 1944).
Such a sentiment for men about to make the supreme sacrifice of their lives has in the author‘s opinion an unnatural ring to ears attuned to the teachings of Christianity. Such a stress on killing or kill rather than on a cause or on victory is definitely at variance with the traditions of Western Christian civilization. It is also costly in the life blood of America, for killing is a two-edged sword. An enemy who would surrender in the face of certain defeat will fight on to the end when truculently promised a killing and more Americans will die with him.
The underlying philosophy of killing was incidentally hostile to the second largest racial strain in America. Germans have from the beginning been second only to the English and Scotch in the make-up of our population. In 1775 the Germans constituted about 10 percent of the white population of the colonies (The Immigration and Naturalization Systems of the United States, p. 233). The total of Dutch, Irish, French ―and all others was slightly less than the Germans, the great bulk of the population being, of course, the English-speaking people from England, Scotland, and Wales. In the first three quarters of the nineteenth century ―German immigration out destanced all other immigration and as of 1950 ―the Germans have contributed over 25 percent of the present white population of the United States. the English element—including Scots, North Irish, and Welsh—alone exceeds them with about 33 percent of the present white population. The Irish come third with about 15 percent (op. cit., p. 233).
Thus in his desire for shedding German blood, apart from military objectives, Roosevelt set himself not against an enemy government but against the race which next to the English gave America most of its life blood. The general merely copied his commander-in-chief. Another tragic factor in any announced stress on killing was, of course, that the Germans whom we were to kill rather than merely defeat had exactly as much to do with Hitler‘s policies as our soldiers in Korea have to do with Acheson‘s policies.
Why did the thirty-four million Americans of German blood make no loud protest?
The answer is this:
In physical appearance, in culture, and in religion, Protestant or Catholic, they were so identical with the majority that their amalgamation had been almost immediate. In 1945 there was a great strain of German Blood in America, but there was no significant vote-delivering body of political German-Americans.
Meanwhile, the ships which took American soldiers to kill Germans and meet their own death in Europe brought home refugees in numbers running in many estimates well into seven figures. According to Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long (testimony before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Nov. 26, 1943), the number of officially admitted aliens fleeing Hitler‘s persecution had reached 580,000 as early as November 1943. Those refugees above quotas were admitted on visitors‘ visas. These facts were released by Congressman Sol Bloom, Democrat of New York, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on December 10 (article by Frederick Barkley, New York Times, Dec. 11, 1943).
On December 11, Congressman Emanuel Celler, Democrat of New York, complained that Mr. Long was, in all the State Department, the man least sympathetic to refugees,‘ and added indignantly that United States ships had returned from overseas ports void of passengers(New York Times, December 12, 1943). Incidentally, in 1944 Mr. Long ceased to be Assistant Secretary of State.
The influx of refugees continued. So great was the number of these people that even with the closing of thousands of American homes by ear casualties, the housing shortage after the war was phenomenal. For the lack of homes available to veterans, some writers blamed capital, some blamed labor, and some found other causes; but none, to the knowledge of the author, counted the homes which had been preempted by refugees, while our soldiers were fighting beyond the seas. by 1951 the situation showed no amelioration, for on August 20 Senator Pat McCarran, chairman of a Senate sub-committee on internal security, said that possibly 5,000,000 aliens had poured into the country illegally, creating a situation potentially more dangerous‘ than an armed invasion (AP dispatch in New York Times, August 20,1951). This statement should be pondered thoughtfully by every true American.
And there are more aliens to come. On September 7, 1951, a five-year program for shifting 1,750,000 of Europe‘s surplus‘ population to new homes and opportunities in the Americas and Australia was disclosed by David A. Morse, head of the International Labor Office of those 1,750,000 persons are likely to be accepted elsewhere than in the United States (for data on Mr. Morse, see Economic Council Letter, No. 200, October 1, 1948, or Who‘s Who in America, 1950-1951). Congressman Jacob K. Javits of New York‘s Twenty-first District, known to some as the Fourth Reich from the number of its refugees from Germany, also wishes still more immigrants. In an article, Let Us Open the Gates (New York Times Magazine, July 8, 1951), he asked for ten million immigrants in the next twenty years.
(3) Our alien-dominated government fought the war for the annihilation of Germany, the historic bulwark of Christian Europe (Chapter I, above). The final phase of this strategically unsound purpose sprouted with the cocky phrase Unconditional Surrender, already mentioned. It was thrown out at a press conference by President Roosevelt at Casablanca on January 24, 1943. . . President Roosevelt went into the press conference in which he as-libbed‘ the historic phrase (Raymond Gram Swing in ―Unconditional Surrender, The Atlantic Monthly, September 1947). According to General Elliott Roosevelt, the President repeated the phrase, thoughtfully sucking a tooth (As He Saw It, p. 117), and added that Uncle Joe might have made it up himself.
Our foul purpose of liquidating Germany flowered with the implemintation of the Morgenthau Plan, an implementation which allowed widespread looting and violence‖by desplaced persons and brought Germans to the verge of starvation, according to Prof. Harold Zink, who served as American Editor of the Handbook for Military Government, in Germany in 1944 and was subsequently Consultant on U.S. Reorganization of German Government, U.S. Troop Control Council for Germany, 1944-1945 (Who‘s Who in America, Vol. 25, 1948-1949, p. 2783). In his book, American Military Government in Germany (Macmillan, 1947, pp. 106 and 111), Prof. Zink writes as follows:
The Germans were forced to furnish food for the displaced persons at the rate of 2,000 calories per day when they themselves could have only 900-1100 calories. The amount available for German use hardly equalled the food supplied by the Nazis at such notorious concentration camps as Dachau…most of the urban German population suffered severely from lack of food.
The hunger at Dachau was war-time inhumanity by people who were themselves desperately hungry because their food stocks and transportation systems had been largely destroyed by American air bombardment; but the quotation from Professor Zink refers to peace-time inhumanity, motivated by vengeance partly in its conception and even more so in its implementation (see Potsdam Agreement, Part III, paragraph 156 in Berlin Reparations Assignment, by Ratchford and Ross, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, p. 206).
Why did inhumanity in Germany go on? Because a little dove, according to President Roosevelt, flew in the Presidents window and roused him against a too easy‘ treatment of the Germans, the little dove being actually Secretary Morgenthau‘s personal representative in the ETO (Zink, op. cit., pp. 131-132)!
Further testimony to the President‘s desire for an inhuman treatment of German people is found in former Secretary of State that James F. Byrnes‘s book, Speaking Frankly (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1947). The President stated to his Secretary of State that the Germans for a long time should have only soup for breakfast, soup for lunch and soup for dinner (p. 182).
The fruits of the Morgenthau Plan were not all harvested at once. The persistence of our mania for destroying the historic heart of Germany was shown vividly in 1947. With Prussia already being digested in the maw of the Soviet, the Allied Control Council in Berlin (March 1) added a gratuitous insult to an already fatal injury when it formally abolished Prussia, the old homeland of the Knights of the Teutonic Order. This could have had no other motive than offending Germans unnecessarily for the applause of certain elements in New York. It was also a shock to all Christians. Catholic or Protestant, who have in their hearts the elementary instincts of Christ-like Mercy (St. Matthew, V. 7), or know in spite of censorship the
great facts of the history of Europe (Chapter I).
Our policy of terrifying the Germans spiritually, and ruining them economically, is understandable only to one who holds his eye in focus upon the nature if the High Command of the National Democratic Party. Vengeance and votes were the sire and dam of the foul monster of American cruelty to the Germans. In the accomplishment of our base purpose there was also a strange pagan self-immolation, for we would not let the West Germans all the way die and spent approximately a billion dollars a year (high as our debt was and is) to provide for our captives the subsistence they begged to be allowed to earn for themselves! Our wanton dismantling of German industrial plants in favor of the Soviet as late as 1950 and our hanging of Germans as late as 1951 (Chapter V,c), more than sex years after the German surrender, had no other apparent motive than the alienation of the German people. Moreover, as the years pass, there has been no
abandonment of our policy of keeping in Germany a number of representatives who, whatever their personal virtues, are personae non grade to the Germans (Chapters III and VI). Our many-facetted policy of deliberately alienating a potentially friendly people violates a cardinal principle of diplomacy and strategy and weakens us immensely to the advantage of Soviet Communism.
The facts and conclusions thus far outlined in this chapter establish fully the validity of Churchill‘s phrase The Unnecessary War. The war was unnecessary in its origin, unnecessarly cruel in its prolongation, indefensible in the double-crossing of our ally Britain, criminal in our surrender of our own strategic security in the world, and all of this the more monstrous because it was accomplished in foul obeisance before the altar if anti Christian power in America.
The facts and conclusions outlined in this chapter raise the inevitable question: How were such things possible? The answer is the subject of the next chapter.