United Public Workers union (Abram Flaxer, president) for being Communist dominated! And note the name United Public Workers in the post list quoted above! Once more, let it be stressed that the removal of Communists from their strategic spots in the government must take precedence over everything else, for government Communists are not only able to steal secret papers and to stand poised for sabotage; they are also often in positions where they prevent action against Communists outside the government. For instance, Mr. Meany testified (op. cit., p.3) that some of the anti-Communist success of the American Federation of Labor has been accomplished despite opposition even from some of our government agencies and departments!
If any reader is still inclined to doubt the essential validity. irrespective of proof in a court of law with judge or judges likely to have been appointed by We need those votes Roosevelt or―Red Herring Truman, of the charges of Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, arch-enemy of the Tydings whitewash, or is inclined to question the judgment of the C.I.O. in its expulsion of government Communists, he should ponder the test formulated by Christ in ancient Palestine: Ye shall know them by their fruits (St. Matthew, VII, 16). There have been large and poisonous harvests from our government-intrenched Communists. The most deadly, including atomic espionage and pro Soviet foreign policy, have been analyzed above (Chapters II, IV, VI).
More recent was the successful Communist Daily Worker campaign for the removal of General MacArthur, a campaign culminating in an across-the-page headline on April 9, 1951, just before General MacArthur was dismissed from his command in Korea, and from his responsibilities in Japan. The pressure of Communists was not the only pressure upon the President for the dismissal of General MacArthur. Stooges, fellow travelers, and dupes helped. The significance of the Communist pressure cannot be doubted, however, by anyone whose perusal of the Daily Worker has shown how many times Communist demands have foreshadowed Executive action (see The Kremlin War on Douglas MacArthur, by Congressman Daniel A. Reed, of New York National Republic, January, 1952).
Here follow some indications of recent fruitful Communist activity within our government, indications which should be studied in full by any who are still doubters. Late in 1948 an article by Constantine Brown was headlined in the Washington Evening Star as follows: Top Secret Documents Known to Reds Often Before U.S. Officials Saw Them. Army Still Busy Kicking Out Reds Who Got In During the War, the Washington Times-Herald headlined of February 11, 1950, the article, by Willard Edwards, giving details on Communist-held positions in the orientation of youthful American soldiers. When Are We Going to Stop Helping Russia Arm? was asked by O.K. Armstrong and Frederic Sondern, Jr., in the December, 1950, Readers Digest. How U.S. Dollars Armed Russia is the title of an article by Congressman Robert B. Chiperfield of Illinois, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (National Republic, 511 Eleventh St., N. W., Washington 7, D.C., February, 1951). See the Congressional Record, or write to the senators concerned, for an account of the successful efforts of Senator Herbert F. O‘Conor of Maryland and Senator John J. Williams of Delaware in breaking up the scandal of our officially permitting, and by our blockade actually aiding, the furnishing of supplies to Chinese Communists when their government troops were at the time killing our young men in Korea! See also the full Text of House Un-American Activities Committee‘s Report on Espionage in the Government (New York Times, December 31, 1948; or, from your Congressman).
If existing laws against Communism, including the Internal Security law whose passage over the President‘s veto was discussed in Chapter VIII are inadequate, appropriate new laws should be recommended by the Department of Justice for dealing with the Communist menace within the United States. They will surely be promptly passed by the Congress. Advance approval of the laws by the Department of Justice is desirable, so that no flaws in the laws‘ coverage can later be alleged by an enforcement official. If the Justice Department will not at once provide the text of a needed law, the judiciary committees of the two Houses are amply able to do so, and should proceed on their own. If any administration, present or future, flouts the anti-subversive laws passed by the Congress, the Congress should take the necessary action including impeachment, if other efforts fail, to secure the enforcement of the laws.
Unless action is soon taken against U.S. Communists (despite any―We need those votes considerations), our whole radar defense and our bomb shelters are wasted money and effort, for there is no way of surely preventing the importation of atom bombs or unassembled elements of them across some point on our 53,904-mile detailed tidal shoreline (exclusive of Alaska, whose detailed tidal shoreline furnishes another 33,904 miles) except to clean out possible recipients of the bombs whether operating in government agencies or elsewhere in the United States. We would by no means by the first country to take steps against Communism. Progress in this direction in Spain and Canada is elsewhere mentioned, Also, the Communist Party has been outlawed in the Middle East countries except in Israel (Alfred M. Lilienthal, Human Events, August 2, 1950).
As a conclusion to this section of the last chapter of The Iron Curtain Over America, let it be stressed that American people in every city block, in every rural village, and on every farm must be vigilant in the matter of opposing Communism and in persuading the government to take effective measures against it.
There has been a tremendous amount of false information disseminated in the world as to the alleged advantages of Communism, said General Wedemeyer in his summation of his recommendations to the MacArthur Committee of the Senate (U.S. News and World Report, June 22, 1951). People all over the world are told that Communism is really the people‘s revolution and that anyone opposing it is a reactionary or a Fascist or imperialist. Because of the prominence of Jews in Communism from the Communist Manifesto (1848) to the atomic espionage trials (1950, 1951), anti-Communist activity is also frequently referred to erroneously as anti-Semitic (see Chapters II, III, and V). This propaganda-spread view that Communism is all right and that those who oppose it are anti-Semitic, or reactionaries of some sort, may be circulated in your community by an actual member of the Communist Party.
More likely, it is voiced by a deluded teacher, preacher, or other person who has believed the subtle but lying propaganda that has been furnished him. Be careful not to hurt the ninety percent or more of American-minded teachers (Educational Gardian, 1 Maiden Lane, New York 7, New York, July, 1951, p. 2) and a probably similar majority of preachers; but use your influence to frustrate the evil intent of the two or five or ten percent of subverters. Draw your inspiration from Christ‘s words, For this cause came I into the world (St. John, XVIII, 37) and let the adverse situation in your community inspire you to make counter efforts for Western Christian civilization. Never forget that the basic conflict in the world today is not between the Russian people and the American people but between Communism and Christianity. Work then, also, for the friendly cooperation of all Christian denominations in our great struggle for the survival of the Christian West. Divided we fall!
In the second place, our foreign military policy must be entirely separated from the question of minority votes in the United States and must be based on the facts of the world as known by our best military scholars and strategists. That such has not been the case since 1933 has been shown above (Chapter VI) in the analyses of our official attitudes toward China, Palestine, and Germany. Additional testimony of the utmost authority is furnished by General Bonner Fellers. In reviewing Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias‘s book Behind Closed Doors (Putnam‘s New York), the former intelligence officer General Fellers states; Behind Closed Doors reveals that we have embarked upon a military program which our leaders know to be unsound, yet they are unwilling to tell the American people the truth! (The Freeman, October 30, 1950).
This statement prompts a mention of the fact that a colonel is the highest rank attainable in and from the United States Army (similarly, a captaincy in the Navy ). By a regulation inherited from the days when the total number of general officers was about twenty-five, all appointments to general rank from the one-star Brigadier to the five-star General of the Army are made by the President of the United States (so also for the corresponding ranks in the Navy). It is obvious that merit is a factor in the choice of generals and admirals as field and fleet commanders. Merit is surely a factor also for many staff positions of star-wearing rank. Just as surely, however, the factor of, political dependability also enters into the selection of those high-ranking staff officers who make policy and are allowed to express opinions. The conclusion is inescapable that our top military Commanders today are muzzled. They do not dare to differ with the civilian side of military questions for fear of being removed or demoted (from Louis Johnson‘s Story is Startling, by David Lawrence, The Evening Star, Washington, June 18, 1951). In view of such testimony derived from a former Secretary of Defense, it must be concluded that it was to a large extent a waste of time for the Senate to summon generals and admirals close to the throne in Washington in the year 1951 for an analysis of Truman-Acheson policies. The following passage from the great speech of General MacArthur
before the Massachusetts Legislature (July 25, 1951) is highly pertinent:
Men of significant stature in national affairs appear to cower before the threat of reprisal if the truth be expressed in criticism of those in higher public authority. For example, I find in existence a new and dangerous concept that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance and loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the executive branch of Government, rather than to the country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend.
If the Congress wants to learn other aspects of a strategic or logistic situation besides the administration‘s viewpoint, it must summon not the agents and implementers of the administration‘s policy, but non-political generals, staff officers below star rank, and retired officers, Regular, National Guard, and Reserve.
Competent officers in such categories are not hard to find. There are also a number of other patriotic Americans with diplomatic experience. In an address over three major networks (April 13, 1951) Representative Joseph W. Martin, Jr., Republican leader in the House, named seven generals including Kurger, Whitney, Chennault, and Wedemeyer; seven admirals including King, Halsey, Yarnell, and Denfeld; four Marine Corps generals, and ten diplomats including Hurley – all of the twenty-eight expert in one way or another on the Far East and none of them close to the Washington throne where Far East policy decisions have come from the plans and thinking of persons such as John Carter Vincent, John S. Service, Owen Lattimore, Philip C. Jessup, Lauchlin Currie, Dean G. Acheson, and their fellow travelers!
No attempt can be here made to analyze fully the complex structure of our foreign relations. Nowhere are any guesses made as to future national policy. No attempt is made to enter into details in the fields of logistics and manpower, and no suggestions will be made on the tactics or strategy of a particular commanders on the scene.
A few words are indicated, however, on the two allied subjects of gasoline and distance from a potential enemy as factors in the defense of the West.
This matter of gasoline is most significant in our choice of areas for massing troops against a possible thrust from the Soviet. Of the world‘s supply, it was estimated in 1950 by petroleum experts that the U.S. and friendly nations controlled 93%, whereas the Soviet controlled 7%. The fighting of a war on the Soviet perimeter (Korea or Germany) would appear thus as an arrangement, whether so intended or not, to give the Soviet leaders a set-up in which their limited supply of gasoline and oil would not be an obstacle.
Beyond question, the Soviet maintains at all times sufficient gasoline reserves for a sudden thrust into close-at-hand West Germany. But the Soviet almost certainly does not have enough gasoline for conquering, for instance, a properly armed Spain which, because of its distance, a properly armed Spain which, because of its distance from Soviet supply sources and because of its water and mountain barriers, has in the age of guided missiles superseded Britain as the fortress of Europe.
This fact, inherent in the rise of the significance of the air arm, prompts an analyses of the Roosevelt and Truman attitudes toward Spain. Though Franklin Roosevelt tolerated benignly the bitter anti-Franco statements of his Communist and other leftist supporters, he maintained more or less under cover a friendly working arrangement by which during World War II we derived from Spain many advantages superior to those accorded by Spain to the Axis countries. Adequate details of Spain‘s help to America in World War II can be had in a convincing article, Why Not a Sensible Policy Toward Spain? by Congressman Dewey Short of Missouri (Reader‘s Digest, May, 1949). The reader interested in still further details should consult the book, Wartime Mission in Spain (The Macmillan Company, New York) by Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes, who served as our Ambassador to Spain from May, 1942, to March, 1945.
To one of the many ways in which Spain helped us, the author of The Iron Curtain Over America can bear personal testimony. When our aviators flew over France they were instructed, if shot down, to make their way to Spain. If Franco had been pro-Hitler, he would have returned them to the Germans. If friendly, he would have turned them over to the United States to give our leaders their priceless intelligence information and to fly again. That is precisely what Franco did; and it was to the office of this writer, then Chief of the Interview Section in the Military Intelligence Service, that a representative number of these fliers reported when flown to Washington via Lisbon from friendly Spain.
The principal trouble with Spain, from the point of view of our influential Leftists, seems to be that there are no visible Communists in that country and no Marxists imbedded in the Spanish government. Back in 1943 (February 21) Franco wrote as follows to Sir Samuel Hoare, British Ambassador to Spain: Our alarm at Russian advances is common not only to neutral nations, but also to all those people in Europe who have not yet lost their sensibilities and their realization of the peril. . . Communism is an enormous menace to the whole world and now that it is sustained by the victorious armies of a great country all those not blind must wake up. More on the subject can be found in Frank Waldrop‘s article, What Fools We
Mortals Be, in the Washington Times-Herald for April 17, 1948.
It is not surprising perhaps that, just as there are no visible Communists in Spain, an anti-Spanish policy has long been one of the main above-board activities of U.S. Communists and fellow travelers. Solicitude for leftist votes has, as a corollary, influenced our policy toward Spain as a leper, not from any action on the part of Spain in the past or the present not from any action on the part of Spain in the past or the present but for the winning of electoral votes, see Britain and an American-Spanish Pact, by University (The Illustrated London News, August 4, 1951).
The following anti-Franco organizations have been listed as Communist by the U.S. Attorney General (see the Senate report, Communist Activities Among Aliens and National Groups, Part III, p. a10):
Abraham Lincoln Brigade
Action Committee to Free Spain Now
Comite Coordinator Pro Republica Espanola
North American Spanish Aid Committee
United Spanish Aid Committee
Another cause of the anti-Spanish propaganda of American leftists is the fact that Spain, aware of History‘s bloody record of the treason of ideologically unassimilated minorities, has not complicated its internal problems by admitting hordes of so-called refugees from Eastern Europe.
The same world forces which blocked our resumption of full diplomatic relations with Spain have prevented the UN from inviting Spain to be a member of that organization.
Whether Spain is in or out of that ill-begotten and seemingly expiring organization may matter very little, but Spain in any defense of the West matters decisively. In allying itself with Spain the United States would exchange a militarily hopeless position on the continent of Europe for a very strong one (Hoffman Nickerson: Spain, the Indispensable Ally, The Freeman, November 19, 1951). The way for friendship with Spain was at last opened when the Senate, despite President Truman‘s bitter opposition, approved in August, 1950, a loan to that country, and was further cleared on November 4, 1950, when the UN, though refusing to lift the ban against Spain‘s full entry into the United Nations, did vote to allow Spanish representation on certain specialized agencies such as the world health and postal organizations (AP dispatch, Dallas Morning News, November 5, 1950). As to the loan authorized by Congress in August, 1950, it was not until June 22, 1951, that the White House and State Department authorized the Export, Import Bank to let Spain buy wheat and other consumer goods out of the $62,500,000 Spanish loan voted by Congress last year (Washington Post, June 23, 1951).
In his testimony to the combined Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees of the Senate on May 24, 1951 (AP dispatch from Washington) Chief of Staff General, Omar Bradley admitted that from a military point of view the Joint Chiefs would like to have Spain on our side. Finally, the clamor of the public and the attitude of the military prevailed and in July, 1951, the United States, to the accompaniment of a chorus of abuse from the Socialist governments of Britain and France (New York Times, July 17, 1951), began official conversations with Spain on mutual defense. On August 20, 1951, a military survey team, which was composed of all three armed services, left Washington for Spain (New York Times, August 21, 1951). This move toward friendly relations for the mutual advantage of the two countries not only has great potential value in the field of defense; it has, if possible, an even greater diplomatic value, for Spain is the Mother Country for all of Latin America from the Rio Grande to Cape Horn with the sole exception of Brazil. Spain is, moreover, of all European countries, the closest in sympathy with the Moslem world.
Each year, for instance, it welcomes to Cordoba and Toledo thousands of Moslem pilgrims. Peace between Moslem and Christian was a century-old fact until ended by the acts of the Truman administration of behalf of Israel. It will be a great achievement if our resumption of relations with Spain leads to a renewal of friendly relations with the Moslem world. We must be sure, however, that our military men in Spain will not be accompanied by State Department and executive agency vivandieres, peddling the dirty wares of subversion and Communism (Human Events, August 8, 1951).
With the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean, and the lofty Pyrenees Mountains as barriers; under the sheltering arm of distance; and above all with no visible internal Communists or Marxists to sabotage our efforts, we can, if our national defense so requires, safely equip Spain‘s eighteen well-disciplined divisions, can develop airfields unapproachable by hostile ground troops, and in the deep inlets and harbors of Spain can secure safe ports for our navy and our merchant fleet. Our strengthening of Spain, second only to our keeping financially solvent and curbing Communists in this country, would undoubtedly be a very great factor in preventing the Soviet leaders from launching an all-out war. Knowing that with distant Pyrenees guarded and American-armed Spain against them, they could not finally win, they almost certainly would not begin.
Our strengthening of Spain‘s army, potentially the best in Europe outside of Communist lands, would not only have per se a powerful military value; it would also give an electric feeling of safety to the really anti-Communist elements in other Western European countries. Such near-at-hand reassurance of visible strength is sorely needed in France, for that country since the close of World War II has suffered from the grave internal menace of approximately 5,000,000 known Communists. In the general election of members of the French National Assembly June 17, 1951, the Soviet-sponsored Communist Party polled more than a fourth of all votes cast (New York Times, June 19, 1951), and remained the largest single political party in France. Moreover, Communist leaders dominate labor in crucial French industries. In France, the Communists are still the dominant factor in the trade unions (The Last Five Years, by George Meany, American Federation of Labor, Washington, D.C., p.11). See also the heavily documented article, French Communism, by Andre La Guerre in Life, January 29, 1951. With Communists so powerful and so ready for sabotage or for actual rebellion, the France of 1952 must be regarded as of limited value as an ally. As said above, however, the dependability of France in the defense of the West would be enhanced by United States aid to the military forces of anti-Communist Spain.
With Spain armed, and with the Socialist government of Britain thrown out by Mr. Churchill‘s Conservative Party in the election of October 25, 1951, the spirit of Europe may revive. If not, it is too much to expect America to save Europe forever, for if 250 million people in Western Europe, with industry far larger than that of Russia, cannot find a way to get together and to build a basis for defense on land, then something fundamental may be wrong with Western Europe, (U.S. News and World Report, June 22, 1951, p. 10). Perhaps the wrong is with our policy—at least largely. For instance, deep in our policy and irrespective of our official utterances, Germany is written off as an ally to avoid political liability in New York
(Frank C. Hanighen in Human Events, February 7, 1951).
Spain, with its national barriers and the strategic position of its territory astride the Strait of Gibraltar, could become one anchor of an oil-and-distance defense arc. By their location and by their anti-Communist ideology, the Moslem nations of the Middle East are the other end of this potential crescent of safety. Friendship with these nations would, like friendship with Spain, be a very great factor in preventing a third worldwide war.
Among nations on the Soviet periphery, Turkey, mountainous and military-minded, is pre-eminently strong. Perhaps because it would be an effective ally, it long received the cold shoulder from our State Department. Suddenly, however, in the autumn of 1951, Turkey, along with Greece, was given a status similar to that of the nations of Western Europe (not, however, including Spain) in the proposed mutual defense against Communism. This apparently reluctant change of policy by our government toward Greece and Turkey seems, like the sending of a military mission to Spain, to have grown unquestionably from public clamor in America as shown in the newspapers, especially in letters from the people, as heard on radio from the patriotic commentators, and as reflected in polls of public opinion. This success of the people in changing the national policy should hearten the average citizen to newer efforts in guiding his country to sound policies. It is most essential for every individual to remember that every great achievement is the result of a multitude of small efforts.
Between Spain and Turkey, the Mediterranean islands, Majorca and Minorca, Corsica and Sardinia, Sicily and Malta, Crete and Cyprus, are well deployed and well fortified by nature, Perhaps the United States should make some of them into impregnable value if an island fortress is shown by Malta‘s surviving the ordeal of Axis bombing in World War II as we; as by Hitler‘s capture of Crete, an operation so costly in time and materiel that it was a factor in the German failure before Moscow in the following December.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, the island of Cyprus (visited by the author) is potentially a very strong bastion. In relationship to the Dardanelles, the Soviet oil fields, and the strategic Aleppo-Baghdad-Cairo tri-angle, Cyprus‘s water-girt site is admirable, Since its mountain ranges reach a height of more than 6,000 feet, and are located like giant breastworks defending a broad interior plain, the island might well become the location of underground hangers and landing fields for a great air fortress. Others of the islands listed above offer advantage of one sort or another to air or other forces.